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In 1980, the Supreme Court gave a reassuring signal to the thennascent biotechnology industry about the availability of patent protection for the fruits of its research when it upheld the patentability of a
genetically modified living organism in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.1
Twenty-five years later, the Court seemed poised to reexamine the
limits of patentable subject matter2 for advances in the life sciences
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1
447 U.S. 303 (1980). See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Story of Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 327 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, eds., 2006).
2
“Patentable subject matter” refers to the categories of inventions that
might be patented, assuming the inventions meet the statutory standards for patent
protection, as distinguished from those that are categorically excluded from the patent
system because of the kinds of things they are. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010); Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). If the invention is within patentable subject
matter, the application still needs to be examined to be sure it meets the tests for novelty, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2010); utility, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (2010); nonobviousness, 35
U.S.C. § 103 (2010); and adequate disclosure, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010). Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). But if the subject matter of the invention is categorically outside the patent system, the invention may not be patented even if it meets
these other tests. But cf. Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV.
591 (2008) (arguing that judicial decisions that purport to rest on categorical exclusions from patentable subject matter may be better explained as involving patents that
fail other standards for patent protection).
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when it granted certiorari in Laboratory Corporation v. Metabolite.3
But the Federal Circuit had not addressed the patentable subject matter issue in Laboratory Corporation, and the Court ultimately dismissed the certiorari petition as improvidently granted.4 Five years
later, two pending cases in which the issue of patentable subject matter has been fully litigated in the lower courts5 provide opportunities
for the Court to resolve some of the uncertainties exposed in Laboratory Corporation.
For the quarter century preceding Laboratory Corporation, the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), the courts, and
the patent bar, had—for the most part—taken it for granted that new
advances in biotechnology were patentable subject matter,6 and moved
on to the details of applying patent law standards such as novelty,7
nonobviousness,8 utility,9 written description,10 and enablement11 to

3

Metabolite Labs. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2004), cert. granted sub nom. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 546
U.S. 999 (2004).
4
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 546 U.S. 999 (2005),
cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 548 U.S. 124 (2006). In both the initial
grant of certiorari and the dissenting opinion of three Justices from the subsequent
decision to dismiss certiorari, the Justices focused on the question of whether the
diagnostic method patent at issue improperly claimed “a basic scientific relationship”
that was categorically excluded from the patent system. 548 U.S. at 129 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the patent claim
is invalid on the ground that it improperly seeks to ‘claim a monopoly over a basic
scientific relationship, … namely, the relationship between homocysteine and vitamin
deficiency.”).
5
Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010),
cert. granted sub nom. Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, 131 S.Ct. 3027
(2011); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
6
There were a few more issues to be worked out after Chakrabarty, such as
the availability of utility patents for plants and animals. See Ex parte Allen, No. 861790, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1987 WL 123816 (B.P.A.I, Apr. 3, 1987) (plants);
J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (plants); In re Hibberd,
227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 1987 WL 71986 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 24, 1985) (animals).
7
See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., 339 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (holding that the patent claims at issue were invalid because there were inherently anticipated by prior art).
8
See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding the patent to
be invalid because “Deuel’s claims 5 and 7 [which were] directed to specific cDNA
molecules[,] would have been obvious in light of the applied references.”); In re
Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (affirming “that appellants’ claims
[were] unpatentably obvious”).
9
See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding patent
claims to be invalid because the claimed invention lacked specific and substantial
utility).
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biotechnology inventions. Older precedents that might have called
patentable subject matter into question,12 although never clearly overruled, had seemed destined to be lost in antiquity, as more recent decisions from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit consistently
overruled prior judicial exclusions from patentable subject matter.13
The Supreme Court’s renewed interest in patentable subject matter
threatened to revive these aging precedents, disturbing the expectations of a patent-sensitive industry.
In 2010, the Supreme Court finally reached the merits of a patentable subject matter dispute in Bilski v. Kappos,14 a case involving a
business method15 rather than a diagnostic method. Although the Jus-

10

See Ariad Pharms. v. Eli Lilly, 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (holding that the asserted claims were “invalid for failure to meet the statutory
written description requirement.”).
11
See Enzo Biochem v. Calgene, 188 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(holding that the claims at issue were “invalid as nonenabled”); In re Wands, 858 F.2d
731, 733 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the appellant’s claims did not fail 35 U.S.C. §
112 because a person skilled in the art could make and practice the claimed invention
without undue experimentation).
12
See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132
(1948) (holding patent claims on mixed culture of naturally occurring bacteria to be
invalid). For a review and analysis of these precedents, see Eileen M. Kane, Patent
Ineligibility:Maintaining a Scientific Public Domain, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 519
(2006) (discussing the limits of patentability) and Linda J. Demain & Aaron Xavier
Fellmeth, Reinventing the Public Domain: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STANFORD L. REV. 303 (2002) (discussing the
scope and purpose of patent law in biotechnology).
13
E.g., State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that a computer-implemented accounting system for pooling
assets from different mutual funds was patentable subject matter, rejecting arguments
that this was a computer-implemented algorithm and a business method, and holding
that patentable subject matter extended to anything that produces a “useful, concrete,
and tangible result”); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Because § 101 includes processes as a category of patentable subject matter, the judicially-defined proscription against patenting of a ‘mathematical
algorithm,’ to the extent such a proscription still exists, is narrowly limited to mathematical algorithms in the abstract.”).
14
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
15
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub. nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). Specifically, Claim 1 of Bilski’s patent application
claimed: “A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by
a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of: (a) initiating a series of
transactions between said commodity provider and consumers of said commodity
wherein said consumers purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical
averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said consumer; (b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk position to said
consumers; and (c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and said market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of mar-
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tices were unanimous in concluding that the claims were not drawn to
patentable subject matter, they differed in their reasoning. Four Justices would have embraced a categorical exclusion for “business
methods”16 but five Justices rejected such an exclusion as inconsistent
with the statutory text.17 All the Justices apparently agreed, however,
that Bilski’s claim fell within the Court’s traditional exclusion of “abstract ideas” from patentable subject matter.18 The Justices also
agreed that the Federal Circuit had repeatedly erred in its interpretation of the Supreme Court’s precedents on patentable subject matter:
first, by setting the bar too low under the “useful, concrete and tangible” test from its 1998 decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group19; and second, by setting too rigid a rule in
the “machine-or-transformation test” as set forth in its 2008 en banc
decision in In re Bilski.20 Meanwhile, the Supreme Court left it to the
ket participant transactions balances the risk position of said series of consumer transactions.” In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949 (citation omitted).
16
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 (Stevens, J. joined by Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, J.J., concurring)
17
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228-29. Five Justices (Kennedy, Roberts, Alito,
Thomas, and Scalia) rejected a “business methods” exclusion as inconsistent with
1999 statutory amendments to provide an infringement defense, codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 273(b)(1), for prior users of patented business methods, id. at 3228-29, while four of
these Justices (not including Scalia) would also reject such an exclusion as outmoded
in the “Information Age,” id. at 3229.
18
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229-30 (“[T]he Court resolves this case narrowly on
the basis of this Court’s decisions in Benson, Flook, and Diehr, which show that
petitioners’ claims are not patentable processes because they are attempts to patent
abstract ideas. Indeed, all members of the Court agree that the patent application at
issue here falls outside of § 101 because it claims an abstract idea.”); id. at 3235 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Although I happen to agree that petitioners seek to patent an
abstract idea, the Court does not show how this conclusion follows ‘clear[ly],’ [] from
our case law.”) (citation omitted).
19
Compare State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that the transformation of data constitutes “a practical
application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces
a ‘useful, concrete, and tangible result.’”), with Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3231 (“[N]othing
in today’s opinion should be read as endorsing interpretations of § 101 that the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has used in the past. See, e.g., State Street, [];
AT&T Corp., [].”) (citations omitted), and id. at 3232 n.1(Stevens, J., concurring)
(“[I]t would be a grave mistake to assume that anything with a ‘useful, concrete and
tangible result,’ State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. [], may
be patented.”).
20
Compare In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (reaffirming “that the machine-or-transformation test, properly applied, is the governing
test for determining patent eligibility of a process under § 101.”), with Bilski, 130 S.
Ct. at 3227 (Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Thomas, & Alito, JJ., and, in pertinent part, by Scalia, J.) (“This Court’s precedents establish that the machine-ortransformation test is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for determin-
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Federal Circuit to figure out the implications of Bilski v. Kappos for
pending cases involving method claims from the biopharmaceutical
industry.21
One case that was then pending before the Federal Circuit, Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,22
involved challenges to product and process claims related to DNA
sequences used in diagnosing breast cancer susceptibility. Before the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski v. Kappos, the district court in
Association for Molecular Pathology granted summary judgment of
invalidity in favor of the challengers, invalidating claims to isolated
DNA sequences encoding the breast cancer susceptibility genes
BRCA1 and BRCA2, as well as claims to diagnostic methods involving the analysis of DNA samples for mutations in those genes.23
Many biotechnology firms hold patents with similar claims, creating
enormous interest in the outcome of this case on appeal.24 Indeed, the
biotechnology industry filed amicus briefs in Bilski v. Kappos alerting
the Court to the implications the decision might have for existing biotechnology patents.25
ing whether some claimed inventions are processes under § 101. The machine-ortransformation test is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patenteligible ‘process.’”) ; id. at 3232 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsberg, Breyer, & Sotomayor, J.J., concurring) (“The Court correctly holds that the machine-ortransformation test is not the sole test for what constitutes a patentable process; rather,
it is a critical clue.”).
21
On the same day that it handed down its decision in Bilski v. Kappos, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated and remanded two such cases that the
Federal Circuit had previously decided under its “machine-or-transformation” test.
Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (claims
patentable subject matter under machine-or-transformation test), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010), on remand, 628 F.3d 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (same); Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, 304 Fed. Appx.
866 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (claims not patentable subject matter under machine-ortransformation test), rehearing denied, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 24202 (Fed. Cir.
2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010).
22
No. 09 Civ. 4515 (RWS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 5,
2010) (amending Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
23
Id.
24
See, e.g., Donald Zuhn, AMP v. USPTO – Briefing Update III, PATENT
DOCS (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.patentdocs.org/2011/02/amp-v-uspto-briefingupdate.html (containing links to most of the thirty amicus briefs that were filed in this
case).
25
See Preview of United States Supreme Court Cases, Briefs: November
2009 – 2010 Term, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/preview_home/publiced_preview_briefs_no
v09.html#bilski (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (containing links to sixty-eight amicus
briefs that were filed in the Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos).
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Perhaps the Supreme Court concluded that the safest course was
to decide Bilski in a way that sheds as little light as possible on pending biotechnology cases. The Bilski tea leaves have something to offer
both challengers and defenders of biotechnology patents. Challengers
may find support in the Court’s renewed endorsement of historical
nonstatutory exclusions of “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas” from patentable subject matter and in the overarching
directive to the Federal Circuit to look to Supreme Court precedents in
elaborating patentable subject matter doctrine.26 Defenders of biotechnology patents may find support in the Court’s disapproval of the
Federal Circuit’s rigid application of the “machine-or-transformation”
test as the sole test of patent-eligibility for processes,27 in its emphasis
on the expansive statutory text as the primary determinant of patentable subject matter,28 and in an explicit expression of concern from
four Justices in Bilski about the impact of the machine-ortransformation test on the patentability of “advanced diagnostic medicine techniques.”29
The majority’s dual focus on the expansive language of the statutory text and on the stare decisis effects of its own more restrictive
26

Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (noting that these exceptions are not required by
statute, but “they are consistent with the notion that a patentable process must be ‘new
and useful.’”).
27
The Court in Bilski did not reject the machine-or-transformation test entirely, but instead approved it as a “useful and important clue” that is not the sole test
for determining patentable subject matter for processes. Id. at 3226-27. Both the
USPTO and the Federal Circuit subsequently seized upon this “clue” in reaffirming
the centrality of the machine-or-transformation test in defining patentable subject
matter. See Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The Supreme
Court’s decision in Bilski … rejected the machine-or-transformation test only as a
definitive test … Thus, the Court did not disavow the machine-or-transformation test.
And, as applied to the present claims, the ‘useful and important clue, an investigative
tool,’ leads to a clear and compelling conclusion, viz., that the present claims pass
muster under § 101.”); U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Memorandum from Robert
W. Bahr, Acting Associate Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, to Patent
Examining Corp, Regarding Supreme Court Decision in Bilski v. Kappos (June 28,
2010), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/bilski_guidance_28jun2010.pdf (“Examiners
should continue to examine patent applications with §101 using the existing guidance
concerning the machine-or-transformation test as a tool for determining whether the
claimed invention is a process under §101.”).
28
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226 (The Supreme Court has “more than once cautioned that courts ‘should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions
which the legislature has not expressed.’”).
29
Id. at 3227 (“As numerous amicus briefs argue, the machine-ortransformation test would create uncertainty as to the patentability of software [and]
advanced diagnostic medicine techniques.”) (Justice Scalia did not join this portion of
the opinion).
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prior decisions sends mixed signals about the Court’s own interpretive
inclinations. It provides limited guidance for future decisions because
it does not rest on any general principles that might inform analysis of
future claims. Indeed, continuing in the tradition of the precedents it
reaffirms, the Court offers no account of what function subject matter
limitations serve in the patent system beyond reciting that patentable
subject matter is “only a threshold test.”30 In the absence of an account
of the function of this threshold test, one can only wonder why the
Supreme Court has reached out to revive previously moribund limitations on patentable subject matter, and what work those limitations
should be doing that distinguishes the threshold test from the further
sorting that goes on in the course of examining claims that get beyond
the threshold for patentability. Some commentators have suggested
that most if not all of the Court’s patentable subject matter precedents
could be better understood in terms of other requirements for patent
protection such as novelty, nonobviousness, or limitations on claim
scope.31 In Bilski v. Kappos, the Court not only failed to offer clear
guidance as to the boundaries of patentable subject matter, but also
missed an opportunity to explain what patentable subject matter is
about.
In this article, I consider alternative accounts of the work that patentable subject matter doctrine might do for the patent system in the
hope of clarifying the application of that doctrine to diagnostic
method claims. I begin with a review of recent doctrinal developments
to show that current patentable subject matter doctrine suffers from a
lack of clarity not only as to what the applicable rules are, but also as
to what those rules are supposed to accomplish. I then consider what it
might mean for patentable subject matter to function, as it is sometimes described, as a “threshold test” of patentability that precedes a
more in-depth examination for compliance with other statutory standards. Although such a threshold test might offer administrative benefits, current patentable subject matter doctrine cannot and does not
function as a threshold test. I next consider what functions patentable
subject matter doctrine might perform beyond the threshold that are
distinct from the functions performed by other doctrinal standards for
30

Id. at 3225 (“The § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test.”).
E.g., John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 622-23 (2009) (highlighting the Court’s ability to restrict the patent system by using the obviousness doctrine); Kristen Osenga, Ants,
Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subject Matter, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1087, 1115-18 (2007)
(arguing that the courts and the Patent Office “may be using § 101 rejections as proxies for other difficult questions of patentability and policy.”); Risch, supra note 2.
31
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patent protection such as novelty, nonobviousness, and adequate disclosure. I conclude that patentable subject matter doctrine performs
functions that are neither entirely distinct from these other doctrines
nor redundant to them. Patentable subject matter doctrine leaves some
aspects of new discoveries in the public domain and limits the scope
of allowable claims in ways that might depart from limitations imposed by prior art and disclosure requirements. Although perhaps
suggestive of prior moorings in public policy, existing doctrine provides minimal guidance as to how to use patentable subject matter
doctrine to further the goals of the patent system.
I. Revival of Subject Matter Exclusions
Although §101 of the Patent Act32 defines patentable subject matter in broad terms to include “any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter,” a long line of judicial decisions recites additional exclusions from patent protection.33 In Bilski
v. Kappos, the Supreme Court characterized these non-statutory exclusions narrowly as “three specific exceptions to § 101’s broad patent-eligibility principles: ‘laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas.’”34 Prior Supreme Court cases have sometimes recited
the exclusions in different and more expansive terms, free of the narrowing qualifier “specific.” For example, the Court has stated that “a
scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable
invention,”35 that “patents cannot issue for the discovery of the
phenomena of nature,”36 that “[p]henomena of nature, though just
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are
not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work,”37 and that “an algorithm, or mathematical formula, is
like a law of nature.”38 In addition to these broadly articulated ex32

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
The Supreme Court’s recent interest in patentable subject matter has inspired a rich literature reviewing these exclusions. See, e.g., Tun-Jen Chiang, The
Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject-Matter, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1353 (2010);
Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “An Unpatentable Abstract
Idea,” 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 37 (2011); John F. Duffy, supra note 31; Allen K.
Yu, Within Subject Matter Eligibility – A Disease and a Cure, 84 So. CAL. L. REV.
387 (2011).
34
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
309 (1980)).
35
Mackay Radio & Tel. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939).
36
Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
37
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
38
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978).
33
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clusions, past judicial decisions and administrative practice seemed to
recognize specific field exclusions from patentable subject matter for
plants and animals,39 medical and surgical techniques,40 business
methods,41 and printed matter.42
None of these limitations is apparent from the statutory language,
and some that once looked like settled, black-letter law have subsequently been questioned if not entirely disavowed by the courts in
more recent decisions.43 Most of the action has been in the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, although the U.S. Supreme Court has
affirmed the patentability of living subject matter in decisions that
broadly assert that patentable subject matter extends to “anything under the sun that is made by man.”44 The Federal Circuit has repeatedly
invoked this language in decisions expanding patentable subject matter to include computer-implemented inventions45 and business methods.46 This expansive approach reached a peak in State Street Bank &
Trust v. Signature Financial Group and AT&T v. Excel Communications. In these cases the Federal Circuit rejected the strictures of earlier decisions that had limited patentable subject matter to inventions
that were “tangible” in the sense of physical or material47 in favor of a
39

See Duffy, supra note 31 at 625-32 (exploring the “[u]npatentability of
plants and animals.”).
40
Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 882-83 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1862) (use of ether for anesthesia cannot be patented); Ex parte Brinkerhoff, No. 182,
24 Dec. Comm’r Pat. (1883) (Case No. 182), reprinted in 27 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 797,
798 (1945) (methods of treatment of diseases not patentable).
41
Lowe’s Drive-In Theatres v. Park-In Theaters, 174 F.2d 547, 551-52 (1st
Cir. 1949) (invalidating a patent for a terraced drive-in movie theater); Hotel Sec.
Checking v. Lorraine, Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908) (invalidating a patent for a
bookkeeping register to prevent fraud in hotels and restaurants).
42
In re Sterling, 70 F.2d 910, 912 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (bank check and stub
system); In re Reeves, 62 F.2d 199, 200 (C.C.P.A. 1932) (chart to aid in appraising
buildings); In re Russell, 48 F. 2d 668 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (system for indexing names in
a directory) .
43
See State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375-78
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (disavowing business methods exclusion); In re Lowry, 32 F.3d
1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (questioning “legal and logical footing” of printed matter
exclusion); Ex parte Scherer 103 U.S.P.Q. 107, 110 (B.P.A.I. 1954) (expressly overruling Brinkerhoff, supra note 40).
44
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing Congressional
committee reports accompanying 1952 Patent Act); J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer HiBred, 534 U.S. 124, 145 (2001) (holding that plants are patentable subject matter).
45
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Arrhythmia Research
Tech. v. Corazonix, 958 F.2d 1053, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
46
AT&T v. Excel Communications, 172 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
47
Compare Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1059-60 (“These claimed steps of ‘converting’, ‘applying’, ‘determining’, and ‘comparing’ are physical process steps that
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broader standard that embraced anything that produces a “useful, concrete, and tangible result.”48
The Supreme Court has never disavowed its own exclusions from
patentable subject matter for laws of nature, products of nature, abstract ideas, and mental processes. But after upholding the patentability of a living organism in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, and of a computer-implemented method for calculating the cure time for molded
rubber articles the next year in Diamond v. Diehr,49 the Court seemed
to retire from policing the subject matter boundaries of the patent system following the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in 1982.50
After a long period of acquiescence51 in the expansive approach of
the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court surprisingly reached out to
address the topic of patentable subject in Laboratory Corporation v.
Metabolite. The patent at issue in that case claimed a method of diagnosing vitamin deficiency by observing homocysteine levels and noticing whether they are elevated.52 The lower courts did not address
whether the patent covered patentable subject matter,53 but the Supreme Court granted certiorari solely on the question of whether the
claims covered patentable subject matter or whether they impermissibly claimed a basic scientific relationship.54 This set off alarm bells in
the biotechnology patent community because the claim at issue retransform one physical, electrical signal into another.”), with AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1358
(“physical transformation” is not “an invariable requirement, but merely one example
of how a mathematical algorithm may bring about a useful application.”).
48
State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373; AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1357.
49
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
50
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
51
The one Supreme Court case to address patentable subject matter during
this period approved the eligibility of plants for utility patent protection. J.E.M. Ag
Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
52
The sole claim at issue recited: “A method for detecting a deficiency of
cobalamin or folate in warm-blooded animals comprising the steps of: assaying a
body fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine; and correlating an elevated
level of total homocysteine in said body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate.” Metabolite Labs. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 (Fed.
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 546 U.S. 999 (2004), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 548 U.S. 124 (2006).
53
Id.
54
More specifically, the Court granted certiorari “limited to question three
as presented in the petition.” 546 U.S. 999. Question three asked “[w]hether a
method patent setting forth an indefinite, undescribed, and nonenabling step directing
a party simply to ‘correlat[e]’ test results can validly claim a monopoly over a basic
scientific relationship used in medical treatment such that any doctor necessarily
infringes the patent merely by thinking about the relationship after looking at a test
result.” http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/04-00607qp.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
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sembled many other patent claims on diagnostic methods that involve
observing and analyzing a biological marker to make a diagnosis or to
determine an appropriate course of treatment.55 A majority of the
Court, perhaps figuring it was not appropriate for the Supreme Court
to address such an important question of patent law without the benefit of the Federal Circuit’s analysis, dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted.56 However, three Justices thought the issue presented
was “not unusually difficult” and were therefore ready to invalidate
the patent claims on subject matter grounds without waiting for the
issue to percolate in the lower courts.57
The claim, according to the dissent, improperly sought to patent a
basic scientific relationship between homocysteine levels and vitamin
deficiencies, and was therefore unpatentable for the same reasons that
preclude patenting e=mc2, the law of gravity, or the heat of the sun.58
Clearly distinguishing patentable subject matter from other requirements for patent protection, the dissent justified the exclusion as a
way to preserve free access to the “basic tools” of scientific research:
The justification for the principle does not lie in any claim that
“laws of nature” are obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or
that they are not useful. To the contrary, research into such
matters may be costly and time-consuming; monetary incentives may matter; and the fruits of those incentives and that research may prove of great benefit to the human race. Rather,
the reason for the exclusion is that sometimes too much patent
protection can impede rather than “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts,” the constitutional objective of patent
and copyright protection.59

55

Kevin Collins calls such claims “determine-and-infer claims.” See Kevin
Emerson Collins, An Initial Comment on Prometheus: The Irrelevance of Intangibility, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.patentlyo.com/collins.intangibility.pdf;
Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 S.M.U. L. Rev. 317, 323-42
(2007); Kevin Emerson Collins, The Irrelevance of Intangibility in Medical Diagnostic Patents U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011); Kevin Emerson Collins, Rethinking
Patent Eligibility: The Knowledge/Embodiment Dichotomy (working paper on file
with the author).
56
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 124, 125
(2006).
57
Id. at 126 (Breyer, J. dissenting). Although Justice Breyer is still on the
Court, the two Justices who joined his dissenting opinion (Souter & Stevens, JJ.) have
since retired.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 126-27.
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The dissenting Justices feared that patents on fundamental scientific principles could
discourage research by impeding the free exchange of information, for example by forcing researchers to avoid the use of potentially patented ideas, by leading them to conduct costly and
time-consuming searches of existing or pending patents, by requiring complex licensing arrangements, and by raising the
costs of using the patented information, sometimes prohibitively so.60
The dissent recognized the difficulty of defining categories like
phenomena of nature, mental processes and abstract intellectual concepts, but nonetheless concluded that the claim before them was not
close to the boundary. They saw the correlation between homocysteine levels and vitamin deficiency as a “natural phenomenon,”61 and
it did not save the claim from invalidity that it was necessary to process a tissue sample in order to measure homocysteine levels.62
Notably, it was a diagnostic method patent, rather than a business
method patent, that brought the attention of the Supreme Court back
to the issue of patent eligibility in Laboratory Corporation . Although some diagnostic method patents have provoked controversy,63
business method patents have been far more controversial among legal scholars and economists.64 But business methods are not basic
60

Id. at 127.
Id. at 134-35.
62
See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
63
See, e.g., Mildred C. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the
Provision of Clinical Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3
(2003); Jon F. Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test: The Pitfalls of Patents
Are Illustrated by the Case of Hemochromatosis, 415 NATURE 577 (2002); Sirpa Soini
et al., Patenting and Licensing in Genetic Testing: Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues,
16 EUR. J. HUMAN GENETICS 10 (2008).
64
See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law,
89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1577-1589 (2003); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business
Method Patents Bad for Business? 16 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263 (2000);
Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577
(1999); David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The
Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMPLE L. REV. 181, 227-36
(2009); Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank Decision: The Bad Business of
Unlimited Patent Protection for Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 61, 92 (1999); Bronwyn H. Hall, Business
Method Patents, Innovation and Policy, University of California, Berkeley Competition Policy Center Working Paper No. CPC03-39 (2003), available at
61
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tools of scientific research, and patents on business methods do not
make a good poster child for the rhetorical moves and policy argument advanced by Justice Breyer for excluding patents on building
blocks to leave room for further innovation.
Although Laboratory Corporation created no binding authority,65
it sounded a warning to the Federal Circuit that its expansive approach
to patentable subject matter might be vulnerable to reversal in an appropriate case. After a series of unanimous reversals of Federal Circuit decisions by the Supreme Court,66 the Federal Circuit seemed
eager for an opportunity to address the issue of patentable subject
matter ahead of the Supreme Court; it went so far as to ask for supplemental briefing on patentable subject matter in an appeal from a
rejection on entirely different grounds.67 Meanwhile, the PTO and the
lower courts resumed rejecting and invalidating claims for lack of
patentable subject matter,68 renewing the flow of appeals and setting
the stage for Federal Circuit and Supreme Court review.69
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=463160 (last visited Oct. 25,
2011).
65
See Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1356 n.2
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Mayo, as did the district court, points to the opinion of three Justices dissenting from the dismissal of the grant of certiorari in Lab. Corp…. Again,
with respect, we decline to discuss a dissent; it is not controlling law, and it involved
different claims from the ones at issue here.”).
66
See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109
(2008); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427–28 (2007); eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006); Merck KGaA v. Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 208 (2005); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 741–42 (2002); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado
Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton
Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 41 (1997).
67
In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“We do not reach
the ground relied on by the Board below--that the claims were unpatentable as obvious … --because we conclude that many of the claims are ‘barred at the threshold by
§ 101.’”) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981)).
68
See Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25062; 86 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1705 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev’d, 581 F.3d 1336 (
Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010), on
remand, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, Patent
Application Publ’n No. 2004/0122764, 2006 Pat. App. LEXIS 51, 2006 WL 5738364
(B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/decisions/inform/fd022257.pdf (last visited Nov.
22, 2011)
69
See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d, 130
S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed.
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 130 S.Ct. 3543 (2010), on remand,
628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, 304 F.
App’x. 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 130 S.Ct. 3541
(2010), on remand, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18126 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2011); Re-
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The first of these cases to command both en banc attention of the
Federal Circuit and Supreme Court review on the merits was Bilski v.
Kappos. Bilski’s patent application claimed a method of hedging
against risks of price fluctuations in commodities trading.70 The PTO
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmed the examiner’s
rejection for lack of patentable subject matter.71The Federal Circuit
had by this time affirmed rejections for lack of patentable subject matter in two other cases, using inconsistent analytical approaches.72 To
clarify the law, the court ordered en banc review in In re Bilski.73
Congress created the Federal Circuit in order to bring greater uniformity and predictability to the application of patent law.74 Mindful
of that mandate, the Federal Circuit often prefers bright-line rules that
point towards clear outcomes in future cases75 over broad, open-ended
standards that require the exercise of judgment and on which reasonable minds can differ. But Supreme Court precedents on patent law,
including its decisions about patentable subject matter, more typically
state broad, open-ended principles.76 The Supreme Court had repeatedly faulted and reversed the Federal Circuit for applying unduly rigid
rules that departed from the flexibility of its own precedents.77 This
dynamic is apparent in Bilski.
search Corp. Technologies v. Microsoft, 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Nuijten,
500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007); .
70
See Bilski, supra note 15.
71
Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, Patent Application Publ’n No.
2004/0122764, 2006 Pat. App. LEXIS 51, 2006 WL 5738364 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26,
2006).
72
Compare In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(method and system for mandatory arbitration involving legal documents not patentable because neither the Framers nor Congress intended patentable subject matter to
include “business systems … that depend entirely on the use of mental processes”),
with In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (transitory watermarked
“signal” in digital audio file not patentable under textual analysis of categories set
forth language of § 101). The Federal Circuit subsequently vacated and withdrew its
opinion in In re Comiskey and revised its decision. 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
73
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
74
See generally Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543 (2003).
75
See John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV.
771 (2003); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach
to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1103-15 (2003).
76
See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
77
See, e.g., KSR Int’l v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (“We begin by
rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of Appeals. Throughout this Court’s engagement with the question of obviousness, our cases have set forth an expansive and
flexible approach inconsistent with the way the Court of Appeals applied its TSM test
here.”); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732
(2002) (“It is true that the doctrine of equivalents renders the scope of patents less
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The Federal Circuit en banc majority attempted to unify the Supreme Court’s previously announced subject matter exclusions and
“to clarify the standards applicable in determining whether a claimed
method constitutes a statutory ‘process’ under § 101.”78 They began
by blending the Supreme Court’s categorical exclusions into one,
characterizing the issue as “whether Applicants are seeking to claim a
fundamental principle (such as an abstract idea) or a mental process.”79 After a lengthy review of the Supreme Court cases, they concluded that:
The Supreme Court… has enunciated a definitive test to determine whether a process claim is tailored narrowly enough to
encompass only a particular application of a fundamental principle rather than to pre-empt the principle itself. A claimed
process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to
a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.80
Because Bilski’s risk hedging method did not “involve the transformation of any physical object or substance, or an electronic signal
representative of any physical object or substance,” and because Bilski admitted failure to meet the alternative machine-implementation
prong of the test, the court concluded that his claims did not qualify as
patentable subject matter under the machine-or-transformation test
and affirmed the rejection.81
certain. It may be difficult to determine what is, or is not, an equivalent to a particular
element of an invention. … These concerns with the doctrine of equivalents, however,
are not new. Each time the Court has considered the doctrine, it has acknowledged
this uncertainty as the price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for innovation, and
it has affirmed the doctrine over dissents that urged a more certain rule.”). A notable
counterexample is Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, 525 U.S. 55, 67 n.11 (1998), in which
the Supreme Court replaced the Federal Circuit’s open-ended standard for determining whether an invention is “substantially complete” based upon a “totality of the
circumstances,” as announced in Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Great Plains Chemical Co.,
103 F.3d 1538, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1997) with a (perhaps) clearer standard of “ready for
patenting.” Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 567.
78
The majority opinion commanded the votes of nine of the twelve members
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir.
2008). One judge wrote a separate concurrence, and three filed dissents. 545 F.3d at
966 (Dyk, J., concurring); 545 F.3d at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting); 545 F.3d at 998
(Mayer, J., dissenting); 545 F.3d at 1011 (Rader, J., dissenting).
79
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 952. This conflation is quite explicit. The majority posits: “As used in this opinion, ‘fundamental principles’ means ‘laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.’ Id. at 952 n.5.
80
Id. at 954 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
81
Id. at 963-64.
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The machine-or-transformation test thus supplied a single brightline rule for excluding all “fundamental principles,” uniting the treatment of a claimed method of hedging risks in commodities trading
with the treatment of e=mc2, the law of gravity, and the heat of the
sun. This comprehensive rule threatened to exclude not only patents
on risk-hedging methods, but also patents on methods of analyzing
diagnostic markers.82 Indeed, shortly after the Federal Circuit en banc
embraced the machine-or-transformation test in Bilski, a Federal Circuit panel relied on Bilski in summarily affirming a trial court decision
invalidating a patent claiming “a method of determining whether an
immunization schedule affects the incidence or severity of a chronic
immune-mediated disorder in a treatment group of mammals, relative
to a control group of mammals.”83 The trial court had held the patent
invalid on the ground that it claimed a natural phenomenon. In a very
brief opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed, but on the different ground
that “Dr. Classen’s claims are neither ‘tied to a particular machine or
apparatus’ nor do they ‘transform[] a particular article into a different
state or thing.’”84
In Prometheus v. Mayo Collaborative Services, the Federal Circuit came out the other way, reversing a district court decision invalidating a patent on a “a method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for
treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder.”85 Although the District Court had held the claims excluded from patentable subject matter because they recited “mental steps” and “natural
phenomena,”86 the Federal Circuit did not separately address these
82
See Kevin Emerson Collins, The (Ir)relevance of Intangibility in Medical
Diagnostic Patents, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (on file with the author).
83
Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, No. WDQ-04-2607, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 98106, at *13 (D. Md. Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d, 304 F. App’x. 866 (Fed.
Cir. 2008), cert. granted, vacated in part, and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010), on
remand, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18126 (Fed. Cir. Aug 31, 2011). See infra notes
181-205 and accompanying text.
84
Classen Immunotherapies, 304 Fed. Appx. at 866. The Federal Circuit did
not consider claim language in its brief unpublished opinion, but at least some of the
claims included as a step in the method “immunizing mammals in the treatment group
of mammals with one or more doses of one or more immunogens,” Classen Immunotherapies, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18126, at *8, a step that triggers an (arguably transformative) immune response in the immunized mammals.
85
Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (reversing 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25062 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008)). The Federal Circuit again reached the same decision through very similar reasoning on remand for reconsideration in light of Bilski v. Kappos. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo
Collab. Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. Mayo Collab.
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4764 (2011). See infra notes 109-125
and accompanying text.
86
Prometheus Labs., 581 F.3d at 1341.
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exclusions but instead used the machine-or-transformation test.87
Rather than reciting a purely diagnostic method, the Prometheus
claims embedded a diagnostic step within a claimed method of optimizing treatment.88 Most of the claims included the steps of (1) administering a drug to a patient and then (2) determining the level of
metabolites in the patient’s blood to determine whether the dose was
too high or too low, but some claims did not recite the “administering” step.89 The Federal Circuit concluded that each of these two steps
satisfied the machine-or-transformation test because (1) giving a drug
to a patient causes transformation in the patient’s body and (2) determining metabolite levels involves chemical assays that bring about
physical and chemical changes in the patient’s tissue samples.90 According to the Federal Circuit, these transformative steps were not
merely incidental data-gathering, but were integral to the treatment
regime.91
In both Classen and Prometheus, the Federal Circuit took its machine-or-transformation test to be entirely dispositive of the issue of
patentable subject matter for the claimed methods, and did not consider whether claims to the analysis of biological markers might call
for a different analysis than claims to business methods. The machineor-transformation rule did not find favor with the biopharmaceutical
industry, and numerous amicus briefs filed with the Supreme Court in
Bilski v. Kappos alerted the Court to the risks that rule posed for patents on diagnostic methods.92
87

Id. at 1346 (holding that “transformation … of the human body following
administration of a drug” satisfied the machine-or-transformation test for a diagnostic
method that involved administering a drug and measuring drug metabolites in a tissue
sample).
88
For example, U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 claim 1, which the Federal Circuit
took to be representative of the independent claims at issue, reads: “A method of
optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal
disorder, comprising: (a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject
having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and (b) determining the level
of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x108 red blood
cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently administered
to said subject and wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per
8x108 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject.” Prometheus Labs., 581 F.3d at 1340.
89
Id. at 1347.
90
Id. at 1346-47.
91
Id. at 1348.
92
See, e.g., Brief for Novartis Corp. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964) available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_
briefs_pdfs_07_08_08_964_PetitionerAmCuNovartisCorp.authcheckdam.pdf; Brief
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II. The Limited Guidance of Bilski v. Kappos
The Supreme Court had no occasion to speak directly to the
proper treatment of diagnostic method claims in its opinion in Bilski v.
Kappos.93 There was little in the majority opinion that would provide
even indirect guidance as to the patentability of any claims other than
those at issue. The Justices all agreed that Bilski’s claims were not
patentable subject matter because they “are attempts to patent abstract
ideas,”94 but they did not explain what that means. Although the Court
insisted that the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-transformation test is
not the exclusive test for patentability of processes, they affirmed that
test as “a useful and important clue” without indicating when that clue
might prove inadequate or misleading.95 Nor, for that matter, did they
explain whether the machine-or-transformation test is “a useful and
important clue” in evaluating the patentability of inventions that are
not processes,96 or of inventions that are not “abstract ideas” but that
for Caris Diagnostics as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 130 S. Ct. 3218
(2010) (No. 08-964), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_
briefs_pdfs_07_08_08_964_PetitionerAmCuCarisDiagnostics.authcheckdam.pdf;
Brief for The Univ. of S. Florida as Amicus Curiae Supporting of Petitioners, 30 S.
Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_
briefs_pdfs_07_08_08_964_PetitionerAmCuUnivofSFlorida.authcheckdam.pdf; Brief
of Adamas Pharm. and Tethys Bioscience as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent,
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_
briefs_pdfs_09_10_08_964_RespondentAmCu2PharmCos.authcheckdam.pdf; Brief
for Biotechnology Indus. Org. et. al as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, 130 S.
Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_
briefs_pdfs_07_08_08_964_NeutralAmCu4MedTechOrgs.authcheckdam.pdf; Brief
for Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party,
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_
briefs_pdfs_07_08_08_964_NeutralAmCuPhRMA.authcheckdam.pdf.
93
See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
94
See supra note 18.
95
As noted supra at n.29 and accompanying text, four Justices expressed
concern that “the machine-or-transformation test would create uncertainty as to the
patentability of software, advanced diagnostic medicine techniques, and inventions
based on linear programming, data compression, and the manipulation of digital signals.” Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227. The opinion went on to “emphasize that the Court
today is not commenting on the patentability of any particular invention, let alone
holding that any of the above-mentioned technologies from the Information Age
should or should not receive patent protection.” Id. at 3228.
96
The machine-or-transformation test, which the Federal Circuit in Bilski
attributed to the Supreme Court, has its origins in cases involving the patentability of
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might fall within a different exclusion, such as products of nature,
phenomena of nature, or mental processes.
Nonetheless, the decision in Bilski v. Kappos alleviated some of
the anxiety triggered in the biopharmaceutical patent community by
the dissenting opinion in Laboratory Corporation v. Metabolite97 and
by the en banc decision of the Federal Circuit in In re Bilski.98 Significantly, the Justices were unanimous in concluding that the machine-or-transformation test was not the sole test of patent-eligibility
for processes, leaving room to argue that process patents involving the
analysis of biomarkers might be patentable even if they do not pass
the machine-or-transformation test.99 To the extent that the Justices
limited the use of that test, they seemed worried that it would exclude
too much rather than too little.100 The rhetorical tone of the majority
opinion in Bilski v. Kappos was more cautious than that of the dissenters in Laboratory Corp. v. Metabolite, emphasizing fidelity to
statutory language and stare decisis and explicitly declining to adopt
“categorical rules that might have wide-ranging and unforeseen impacts.”101 For an industry seeking to preserve the patent-eligibility of
processes. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) (“Transformation and
reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a
process claim that does not include particular machines.”); Cochrane v. Deener, 94
U.S. 780, 788 (1877) (a “process” is “an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the
subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing”);.
97
See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
98
See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
99
See William J. Simmons, Bilski v. Kappos: The U.S. Supreme Court
Broadens Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 28 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 801, 805
(2010) (“the Court narrowly avoided a catastrophe for the biotech and pharmaceutical
industry”): Roy Zwahlen, BIO Commends Supreme Court for Expansive View of
Patentability in Bilski Decision, BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG. (June 28, 2010)
http://patentlybiotech.wordpress.com/2010/06/28/bio-commends-supreme-court-forexpansive-view-of-patentability-in-bilski-decision/ (“This ruling specifically states
that the ‘machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for patent eligibility’ and
recognized that the lower court’s ruling could have created uncertainty in fields such
as advanced diagnostic medicine techniques.”).
100
This concern is most clearly articulated in portions of Justice Kennedy’s
opinion that Justice Scalia did not join and that therefore failed to command a majority of the Court. See, e.g, Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3227 (“The machine-or-transformation
test may well provide a sufficient basis for evaluating processes similar to those in the
Industrial Age — for example, inventions grounded in a physical or other tangible
form. But there are reasons to doubt whether the test should be the sole criterion for
determining the patentability of inventions in the Information Age. As numerous
amicus briefs argue, the machine-or-transformation test would create uncertainty as to
the patentability of software, advanced diagnostic medicine techniques, and inventions based on linear programming, data compression, and the manipulation of digital
signals.”).
101
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229.
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its advances, a narrow opinion limited to the facts of Bilski v. Kappos
was grounds for cautious optimism.
The post-Bilski decisions of the Federal Circuit reveal a divergence of views within that court as to the impact of Bilski on the revival of patentable subject matter exclusions set off by Laboratory
Corporation v. Metabolite. Two opinions authored by Judge Lourie102
make the most of the Supreme Court’s qualified endorsement in Bilski
of the machine-or-transformation test as an “important clue” for distinguishing patent-eligible processes from abstract ideas. These opinions apply that test to diagnostic method claims, notwithstanding concerns expressed by a plurality of four Justices about its appropriateness for “advanced diagnostic medical techniques.” Under this approach the key to patent eligibility for diagnostic methods is a chemically transformative step recited in the claim language. Judge Lourie
also looks to chemistry to define the scope of the exclusion from patentable subject matter for products of nature, holding that a claim to
isolated DNA is patentable subject matter if isolation of the claimed
material from its natural environment requires the breaking of “covalent bonds.”103 By reverting to the bright-line approach of the Federal
Circuit’s own en banc decision in Bilski, these opinions arguably curtail patentable subject matter further than the Supreme Court required
when it rejected the machine-or-transformation test as the “sole test”
of patent eligibility.104
Chief Judge Rader takes a different approach, reading the Supreme Court in Bilski as disapproving of non-statutory limitations on
patentable subject matter, such as the machine-or-transformation test,
while directing the Federal Circuit to develop criteria for identifying
unpatentable “abstract ideas” that are not inconsistent with the statutory text.105 Eschewing bright-line rules, Judge Rader emphasizes that
patentable subject matter is only a “threshold test” that need not exclude every invention that is unworthy of a patent.106 Instead, before
102

Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010),
cert. granted sub nom. Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 2011 U.S. LEXIS
4764 (2011); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
103
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1352.
104
Cf. CyberSource v. Retail Decisions, 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(claimed method for verifying the validity of an internet transaction invalid both
under machine-or-transformation test and because process could be performed by
human mentally or using pen and paper).
105
Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft, 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, Nos. 2006-1636, 2006-1649, slip op. at 13
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2011) (additional views of Rader, C.J., joined by Newman, J.).
106
Research Corp. Techs., 627 F.3d at 868.
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excluding a claim from patentable subject matter for abstractness,
“this disqualifying characteristic should exhibit itself so manifestly as
to override the broad statutory categories of eligible subject matter
and the statutory context that directs primary attention on the patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act.”107 Under this minimalist approach to patentable subject matter exclusions, “inventions with
specific applications or improvements to technologies in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that they override the statutory
language and framework of the Patent Act.”108 This approach, while
responsive to the Supreme Court’s admonition to honor the expansive
statutory language of § 101, seems to ignore the Court’s explicit rejection of the Federal Circuit’s own previous “useful, concrete and tangible” test for patentable subject matter from its 1998 decision in State
Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group.109
A. The Enduring Machine-or-Transformation Test
The first opportunity to apply the teachings of Bilski v. Kappos to
biopharmaceutical methods fell to Judge Lourie. On reconsideration
of Prometheus Labs. on remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the continuing centrality of the machine-ortransformation test as the primary determinant of patentability.110
Judge Lourie began the opinion for a unanimous panel111 by characterizing the patentable subject matter issue as whether the claims112
would “entirely preempt” the use of a natural phenomenon, which
would make them invalid under Gottschalk v. Benson and Parker v.
Flook, or whether they were drawn “only to a particular application of
that phenomenon,” as permitted by Diamond v. Diehr.113 He noted
that the Federal Circuit’s first decision in the same case had concluded
“that Prometheus’ claims are drawn not to a law of nature, but to a
particular application of naturally occurring correlations, and accord107

Id. at 868.
Id. at 869. See also Ultramercial v. Hulu, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(method of distributing content over the internet in exchange for viewing advertisements was patentable subject matter as a practical application of idea that advertising
can serve as currency).
109
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
110
Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010),
cert. granted sub nom. Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 2011 U.S. LEXIS
4764 (2011).
111
Id. at 1349. The other panel members were Chief Judge Rader and Judge
Bryson.
112
See supra note 88.
113
Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d at 1354.
108
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ingly do not preempt all uses of the recited correlations between metabolite levels and drug efficacy or toxicity.”114 Noting that the Supreme Court opinion did not “disavow” the machine-ortransformation test, but rather characterized it as “a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed
inventions are processes under § 101,” Judge Lourie concluded that
“as applied to the present claims, the ‘useful and important clue, an
investigative tool,’ leads to a clear and compelling conclusion, viz.,
that the present claims pass muster under § 101. They do not encompass laws of nature or preempt natural correlations.”115 In other words,
the panel found the same “useful and important clue” that helped determine that the claims in Bilski covered “abstract ideas” also useful in
discerning whether a claim is impermissibly drawn to laws of nature
or preempts natural correlations; otherwise, the panel’s conclusion
would be a non sequitur.
But the equivalence of “abstract ideas” and “phenomena of nature” is by no means self-evident. “Abstract idea” is an ambiguous
term that the Supreme Court has regrettably left undefined.116 One
understanding of the term “abstract” is the opposite of “concrete” or
“tangible.”117 The machine-or-transformation test may be a good
proxy for this particular meaning of “abstract,” but phenomena of
nature are not necessarily abstract in this sense. Although abstract
ideas and mental processes may be recognized by their intangible
character, many natural phenomena (including the judicial litany of
e=mc2, gravity, and the heat of the sun) bring about the transformation
of matter from one state to another. Perhaps, then, we need another
114

Id. at 1355. Although the Federal Circuit does not pinpoint where in its
prior decision it analyzes the preemption issue, the prior decision pervasively conflates the question of preemption of a natural phenomenon with the machine-ortransformation test. See, e.g., Prometheus Labs., 581 F.3d at 1349 (“The claims cover
a particular application of natural processes to treat various diseases, but transformative steps utilizing natural processes are not unpatentable subject matter. Moreover,
the claims do not preempt natural processes; they utilize them in a series of specific
steps. … Regardless, because the claims meet the machine-or-transformation test,
they do not preempt a fundamental principle. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954 (characterizing the machine-or-transformation test as ‘a definitive test to determine whether a
process is tailored narrowly enough to encompass only a particular application of a
fundamental principle rather than to pre-empt the principle itself’). The inventive
nature of the claimed methods stems not from preemption of all use of these natural
processes, but from the application of a natural phenomenon in a series of transformative steps comprising particular methods of treatment.”)
115
Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d at 1353-55.
116
See Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “An Unpatentable Abstract Idea”, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 37, 53-60 (2011) (analyzing the
possible meaning of “abstract idea”).
117
Id. at 54.

22

WISDOM OF THE AGES OR DEAD-HAND CONTROL?

clue to separate out patentable applications of natural phenomena
from the unpatentable phenomena themselves.
The excluded category that seems most relevant to the Prometheus claims is “mental processes.”118 The Prometheus claims are an
example of what Professor Kevin Collins calls “determine and infer”
claims.119 These claims involve determining a measurable medical
fact or biomarker for an individual120 and then making an inference
from the value of that biomarker about the individual’s health or diagnosis. The inference step may be what makes the invention useful,
and perhaps what distinguishes it from the prior art.
Consider the following claim at issue in Prometheus:
A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of
an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:
(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject
having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder,
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol
per 8x108 red blood cells indicates a need to increase the
amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject
and
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol
per 8x108 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the
amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject.121
The Prometheus opinion recognizes that the exclusion for mental
processes might be a problem for those elements of the claim that
recite diagnostic inferences, but concludes that the claim as a whole
nonetheless recites patentable subject matter because it satisfies the
machine-or transformation test:
We agree with the district court that the final “wherein”
clauses are mental steps and thus not patent-eligible per se.
However, although they alone are not patent-eligible, the
118

Cf. id. at 46 (arguing that Federal Circuit has improperly conflated the
excluded categories of “abstract idea” and “mental process”).
119
See supra note 55.
120
E.g., Prometheus Labs., supra note 88.
121
Prometheus Labs., 581 F.3d at 1340 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623
claim 1 (filed Apr. 8, 1999)).
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claims are not simply to the mental steps. A subsequent mental
step does not, by itself, negate the transformative nature of
prior steps. Thus, when viewed in the proper context, the final
step of providing a warning based on the results of the prior
steps does not detract from the patentability of Prometheus’s
claimed methods as a whole. … No claim in the Prometheus
patents claims only mental steps.122
This analysis stands in marked contrast to that of the dissenting
justices in Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Metabolite
Laboratories.123 The Laboratory Corporation claim also included
transformative process steps to detect homocysteine levels, and the
patent holder pointed to those steps in arguing that the claim was
drawn to an “application of a law of nature” rather than to the natural
correlation itself, but the dissenting Justices were unpersuaded:
Claim 13’s process instructs the user to (1) obtain test results
and (2) think about them. Why should it matter if the test results themselves were obtained through an unpatented procedure that involved the transformation of blood? Claim 13 is
indifferent to that fact, for it tells the user to use any test at all.
… [A]side from the unpatented test, they embody only the correlation between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency that the
researchers uncovered. In my view, that correlation is an unpatentable ‘natural phenomenon,’ and I can find nothing in
claim 13 that adds anything more of significance.124
Judge Lourie dismissed this analysis in a footnote to the Prometheus opinion, stating that “with respect, we decline to discuss a dissent; it is not controlling law, and it involved different claims from the
ones at issue here.”125 The panel might instead have distinguished
Laboratory Corporation in ways that would have been more illuminating in future cases.126 That they did not even make the effort sug-

122

Prometheus Labs.,628 F.3d at 1358.
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006)
(per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
124
Id. at 136-38 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
125
Prometheus Labs., 628 F.3d at 1356 n.2.
126
They might, for example, have considered whether it mattered that the
diagnostic analysis set forth in the Prometheus claims was embedded in a treatment
intervention, while the diagnostic analysis set forth in the Laboratory Corporation
claim would cover observation and analysis of data from a patient who was not receiving any treatment.
123
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gests, perhaps, that they no longer think the views of the dissenters
could command a majority of the Supreme Court today.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Mayo Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories127 on the following question, as
framed by Mayo in its petition:
Whether 35 U.S.C. § 101 is satisfied by a patent claim that
covers observed correlations between blood test results and patient health, so that the claim effectively preempts all uses of
the naturally occurring correlations, simply because wellknown methods used to administer prescription drugs and test
blood may involve “transformations” of body chemistry.128
This framing packs into a single sentence at least three distinct issues, including (1) the relevance (and meaning) of whether observed
correlations are “naturally occurring,” (2) the relevance (and meaning)
of whether the claim “effectively preempts all uses” of the correlations, and (3) the relevance of whether the steps in the process relied
upon to satisfy the machine-or-transformation test—administering a
drug and taking a blood test—are “well-known.” A fourth issue is the
relevance of the machine-or-transformation test to the patent eligibility of the claims at issue.
The first of these issues goes to the meaning of the exclusion for
“phenomena of nature” in the context of medical interventions. The
petitioner’s assertion that the correlation between observed levels of a
drug metabolite and the need to adjust drug dosage is “naturally occurring,” perhaps intended to revive the concerns of the Laboratory
Corporation dissenters, points to the clearest ground for distinguishing the two cases. Even accepting that the correlation between homocysteine levels and vitamin deficiency was a “natural phenomenon”
that removed the Laboratory Corporation claim from patentable subject matter,129 the correlation recited in the Prometheus claim between
drug metabolite levels and the need to adjust a patient’s drug dosage
poses a more difficult question. Vitamin deficiencies arguably arise in
nature, but the Prometheus correlation is embedded in a therapeutic
regimen that requires human intervention. If observations of the bio127

Mayo Collaborative Servs., 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4764 (June 20, 2011).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., (No. 10-1150), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/10-01150qp.pdf.
129
This assertion might not withstand close analysis. Quite apart from the
(entirely conventional) human interventions necessary to measure cobalamin levels, a
diagnosis of “vitamin deficiency” is itself a human construct, requiring human judgment as to what is normal and what is pathological.
128
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logical consequences of therapeutic interventions, and related inferences about the need to adjust those interventions, were to be excluded from patent protection, it would seem that the reason must lie
outside the exclusion for “phenomena of nature.”
The second issue recalls prior Supreme Court cases invalidating
claims that “wholly preempt” use of an unpatentable claim element,
such as a mathematical algorithm or a natural phenomenon, and that
are thus deemed to claim the unpatentable element itself.130 Again,
this issue might look different in the context of a purely diagnostic
claim (such as that at issue in Laboratory Corporation) than it does in
claims that embed a diagnostic step in a specific regimen for adjusting
ongoing treatment (such as those at issue in Prometheus). A claim that
is tied to a particular treatment regimen might not “wholly preempt” a
natural correlation between biomarker and inferred medical condition
if the claim would not be infringed by substituting different biomarker
values as indicators of a need to adjust the drug dosage, or by prescribing a different treatment for the same condition. Every claim
“wholly preempts” the subject matter that it covers; the issue is how
broadly one may claim a diagnostic inference. One might further
question whether itis fair to characterize a correlation between an observed biomarker and the inference of a need to adjust treatment as a
natural phenomenon, or whether that correlation is more accurately
understood as an artifact of human medical intervention.
The third issue concerns the fact that the novel contribution of the
inventor—the mental step of inferring a need to adjust the drug dosage from observed values for a biomarker—is not patentable subject
matter taken alone, as the Federal Circuit conceded.131 Some prior
Supreme Court decisions have invalidated claims in which the valueadded of the inventor beyond unpatentable elements (such as a
mathematical algorithm or a product of nature) is unworthy of patent
protection in its own right; however, it has not always been clear
whether the problem with these claims is lack of patentable subject
matter or something else, such as obviousness or lack of novelty.132
The Laboratory Corporation dissenters dismissed as irrelevant to
patent eligibility the fact that the diagnostic method claim before them
included an assay step that required chemical transformation of a tissue sample through an unspecified (and unclaimed) process.133 Intuitively it may seem odd to rest the determination of patentable subject
matter on the transformative character of incidental claim elements
130
131
132
133

See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 245-252 and accompanying text.
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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that do not otherwise contribute to the patentability of the invention.
But arguably the Supreme Court did just that in Diamond v. Diehr,134
when it affirmed the patent eligibility of a computer-implemented
“method of operating a rubber-molding press with the aid of a digital
computer,”135 over a vigorous dissent pointing out that the only patentable difference between the invention and the prior art was the use of
an unpatentable “algorithm” to calculate the rubber cure time.136 In
Bilski v. Kappos the Supreme Court noted that patentable subject matter is only a “threshold test,” and that inventions that pass that test
must still meet other statutory requirements for protection, including
novelty, utility, nonobviousness, and adequate description.137 Perhaps,
then, the Court will affirm the Federal Circuit’s approach of relying
on physically transformative steps that are not themselves new or patentable to establish the patent eligibility of a method that relies upon
non-transformative mental steps to meet the other requirements for
patentability, thus leaving it to other doctrinal tools to reject or invalidate the claims for lack of novelty or for obviousness if appropriate.138
But if the machine-or-transformation test has more than talismanic
significance as a clue to patent eligibility, perhaps it should not be so
easily evaded by reciting in the claims conventional steps that do
nothing to distinguish the invention from the prior art.139
Rather than elaborating upon the machine-or-transformation test,
the Court might instead seize the opportunity to clarify what it meant
in Bilski v. Kappos when it disapproved of the Federal Circuit’s reliance on the machine-or-transformation test as the “sole test” of patent
eligibility.140 Although explicitly acknowledging this directive from
the Supreme Court, in practice some Federal Circuit panels and the
PTO have used the machine-or-transformation test to the exclusion of
other analytical approaches to identify patentable subject matter.141 If
134

450 U.S. 175 (1981).
Id. at 179 n. 5, 192-93.
136
Id. at 193, 207-208 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225.
138
35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2010).
139
Of course, new combinations of old elements may be patentable if the
combination itself is not suggested in the prior art.
140
See supra notes 20 and 27.
141
The PTO directed examiners to continue using the machine-ortransformation test the day after the Supreme Court decision in Bilski v. Kappos. See
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, Acting Associate Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, to Patent Examining Corp, Regarding Supreme Court Decision in Bilski v. Kappos (June 28, 2010), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/bilski_guidance_28jun2010.pdf (“Examiners
should continue to examine patent applications for compliance with section 101 using
the existing guidance concerning the machine-or-transformation test as a tool for
135
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this is not what the Supreme Court intended, it may need to be clearer
about when use of the machine-or-transformation test is inappropriate.
Readers of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Bilski v. Kappos might
suspect that what he (and the three Justices joining Part II.B.2 of his
opinion)142 meant in stating that the machine-or-transformation test is
not the sole test for patentability is that while inventions that pass that
test are patent-eligible subject matter, inventions that fail that test
might get to take a different test:
The machine-or-transformation test may well provide a sufficient basis for evaluating processes similar to those in the Industrial Age -- for example, inventions grounded in a physical
or other tangible form. But there are reasons to doubt whether
the test should be the sole criterion for determining the patentability of inventions in the Information Age. As numerous
amicus briefs argue, the machine-or-transformation test would
create uncertainty as to the patentability of software, advanced
diagnostic medicine techniques, and inventions based on linear
programming, data compression, and the manipulation of digital signals. …
In the course of applying the machine-or-transformation test to
emerging technologies, courts may pose questions of such intricacy and refinement that they risk obscuring the larger object of securing patents for valuable inventions without transgressing the public domain. … As a result, in deciding whether
previously unforeseen inventions qualify as patentable “process[es],” it may not make sense to require courts to confine
themselves to asking the questions posed by the machine-ortransformation test. §101’s terms suggest that new technologies may call for new inquiries.143
The Federal Circuit has sometimes persisted in applying the machine-or-transformation test to “advanced diagnostic medicine techdetermining whether the claimed invention is a process under §101. If a claimed
process meets the machine-or-transformation test, the method is likely patent-eligible
under §101 unless there is a clear indication that the method is directed to an abstract
idea. If a claimed method does not meet the machine-or-transformation test, the
examiner should reject the claim under §101 unless there is a clear indication that the
method is not directed to an abstract idea.”).
142
Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3223 (The excerpt from Justice Kennedy’s opinion set
forth in text was joined by Justices Roberts, Thomas, and Alito, but not by Justice
Scalia, who joined other portions of the opinion.).
143
Id. at 3227-28 (citations omitted).
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niques” even when it excludes such techniques from patent eligibility.
Writing for a different Federal Circuit panel, Judge Lourie used the
machine-or-transformation test to invalidate diagnostic method claims
in Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office.144 In that case, the Federal Circuit reviewed a district court
ruling145 issued after the Federal Circuit’s embrace of the machine-ortransformation test in In re Bilski and its first opinion in Prometheus
v. Mayo, but before the Supreme Court decision in Bilski v. Kappos.
The district court held invalid multiple product and process claims
related to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 breast cancer susceptibility genes.
A sharply divided Federal Circuit panel146 reversed the district court
in part to uphold the validity of “composition of matter” claims to
“isolated DNA” molecules.147 However, the panel was unanimous in
its analysis of the process claims. Each member of the panel joined
Judge Lourie’s opinion affirming the invalidity of claims to methods
of comparing or analyzing human DNA samples to detect alterations
or mutations indicating increased susceptibility to breast cancer148 and
reversing the district court to uphold the patent eligibility of a claim to
a method of screening potential cancer therapeutics.149
144

Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(The panel included Judge Lourie, Judge Moore, and Judge Bryson.).
145
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2010).
146
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d 1329. Each member of the 3judge panel wrote separately, with two judges concluding that the claims to isolated
DNA were patentable subject matter, id. at 1333-34 (opinion of Lourie, J.); id. at
1358 (opinion of Moore, J., concurring in part); id. at 1373 (Bryson, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (concluding that claims to BRCA genes and gene fragments were not directed to patentable subject matter).
147
Id. at 1334 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 claim 1 (filed June 7,
1995)) (“An isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide having
the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO: 2.”).
148
E.g., id. at 1334 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999 claim 1 (filed June 7,
1995) (“A method for detecting a germline alteration in a BRCA1 gene, said alteration selected from a group consisting of the alterations set forth in Tables 12A, 14, 18,
or 19 in a human which comprises analyzing a sequence of a BRCA1 gene or BRCA1
RNA from a human sample or analyzing a sequence of BRCA1 cDNA made from
mRNA from said human sample with the proviso that said germline alteration is not a
deletion of 4 nucleotides corresponding to base numbers 4184-4187 of SEQ ID
N0:1.”).
149
See id. at 1335 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 claim 20 (filed June 7,
1995) (“A method for screening potential cancer therapeutics which comprises:
growing a transformed eukaryotic host cell containing an altered BRCA1 gene causing cancer in the presence of a compound suspected of being a cancer therapeutic,
growing said transformed eukaryotic host cell in the absence of said compound, determining the rate of growth of said host cell in the presence of said compound and
the rate of growth of said host cell in the absence of said compound and comparing
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Judge Lourie’s analysis of the method claims is a straightforward
application of the machine-or-transformation test, which the district
court had relied upon in holding these claims invalid.150 The panel
held that the method claims to “comparing” or “analyzing” gene sequences “fall outside the scope of § 101 because they claim only abstract mental processes.”151 The opinion rejected the argument that
the method is patent eligible because it can only be performed after
the prior steps of extracting DNA from a human sample and sequencing the BRCA DNA molecules in the sample, noting that the claim
language does not include these prior steps.152 This allowed the court
to distinguish the Prometheus claims, which included the “transformative” steps of “administering” a drug to a patient and “determining”
the levels of a drug metabolite in a patient.153 The opinion concluded
that claims to methods of “comparing” and “analyzing” DNA sequences “fail to satisfy the machine-or-transformation test, and are
instead directed to the abstract mental process of comparing two nucleotide sequences. The claims thus fail to claim a patent-eligible
process under § 101.”154
The panel also relied on the machine-or-transformation test as an
“important clue” to reverse the district court’s holding of invalidity for
a claim to a method for screening potential cancer therapeutics.155 The
court noted that the claim recites the “inherently transformative” steps
of (1) “growing” host cells transformed with an altered BRCA1 gene
in the presence or absence of a potential cancer therapeutic, and (2)
“determining” the growth rate of the host cells with or without the
potential therapeutic:
The claim thus includes more than the abstract mental step of
looking at two numbers and “comparing” two host cells’
growth rates. The claim includes the steps of “growing” transformed cells in the presence or absence of a potential cancer
therapeutic, an inherently transformative step involving the
manipulation of the cells and their growth medium. The claim
the growth rate of said host cells, wherein a slower rate of growth of said host cell in
the presence of said compound is indicative of a cancer therapeutic.”).
150
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, No. 09 Civ. 4515 (RWS), 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418 at *147-61. Indeed, the district court had the Federal Circuit’s first opinion in Prometheus before it and took pains to distinguish the two
cases. Id. at *149-60.
151
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1355.
152
Id. at 1356.
153
154
155

Id. at 1357. See also supra notes 85-91.
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1357.
Id. at 1357-58; see supra note 149 for the language of the claim.
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also includes the step of “determining” the cells’ growth rates,
a step that also necessarily involves physical manipulation of
the cells.156
After this analysis of the method claims under the machine-ortransformation test, the opinion recites a litany of phrases from the
patentable subject matter caselaw in support of its conclusion, including that “the claim is not so ‘manifestly abstract’ as to claim only a
scientific principle” and that “the claims do not preempt all uses of the
natural correlations; they utilize them in a series of specific steps.”157
But it is the machine-or-transformation test that appears to do the real
work for the panel of distinguishing between the unpatentable claims
to methods of “comparing” and “analyzing” and the patent eligible
claims to methods of screening potential cancer therapeutics.
With the benefit of the Federal Circuit’s opinion it would not be
difficult to redraft future diagnostic method claims to recite patentable
subject matter. Using Prometheus Laboratories v. Mayo Collaborative Services and American Association for Molecular Pathology v.
USPTO as guides, patent applicants could satisfy the machine-ortransformation steps by reciting as claim limitations transformative
steps that necessarily precede any comparison of the value of a biomarker for a particular patient with a reference value. Consider, for
example, claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999, held invalid under the
machine-or-transformation rule:
A method for detecting a germline alteration in a BRCA1
gene, said alteration selected from a group consisting of the alterations set forth in Tables 12A, 14, 18, or 19 in a human
which comprises analyzing a sequence of a BRCA1 gene or
BRCA1 RNA from a human sample or analyzing a sequence
of BRCA1 cDNA made from mRNA from said human sample
with the proviso that said germline alteration is not a deletion
of 4 nucleotides corresponding to base numbers 4184-4187 of
SEQ ID N0:1.158
The downfall of this claim is that it begins with the mental step of
“analyzing” a sequence without reciting the prior steps necessary to
obtain and process a tissue sample in order to have a sequence to analyze. Compare claim 46 of U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623, which the Fed156
157
158

Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1357.
Id. at 1358.
U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999 claim 1 (filed June 7, 1995).
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eral Circuit approved as claiming patentable subject matter in Prometheus:

A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy and reducing
toxicity associated with treatment of an immunemediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:
….
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine or 6methylmercaptopurine in a subject administered a drug
selected from the group consisting of 6-mercaptopurine,
azathiop[u]rine, 6-thioguanine, and 6-methylmercaptoriboside, said subject having said immunemediated gastrointestinal disorder,
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol
per 8x108 red blood cells indicates a need to increase the
amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject
and wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400
pmol per 8x10 8 red blood cells or a level of 6methylmercaptopurine greater than about 7000 pmol per 8x10
8
red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of
said drug subsequently administered to said subject.159
The Federal Circuit saw the analytical inferences in the “wherein”
clauses of this claim as unpatentable mental steps, but the “determining” step set forth prior to those clauses was a transformative step that
satisfied the machine-or-transformation test and saved the claim from
invalidity. If that is all it takes, it would seem that Claim 1 of the ‘623
patent could likewise be saved by inserting explicit claim steps of
“obtaining a DNA sample from a patient” and “determining the
BRCA1 or BRCA2 DNA sequence in the patient’s DNA” immediately before the word “analyzing.”160
It is by no means clear that this is what the Supreme Court had in
mind in approving the machine-or-transformation test as a “useful
clue” but not the “sole test” of the patent eligibility of processes. Prior
decisions have sometimes found similar claims-drafting maneuvers
inadequate to avoid an exclusion from patentable subject matter, insisting, for example, that the transformative claim element should be
159

U.S Patent No. 6,355,623 claim 1 (filed Apr. 8, 1999); Prometheus Labs,
628 F.3d at 1349 (“[W]e again hold that Prometheus’s asserted method claims are
drawn to statutory subject matter, and we again reverse the district court’s grant of
summary judgment of invalidity under § 101.”).
160
Prometheus Labs, 628 F.3d at 1350.

32

WISDOM OF THE AGES OR DEAD-HAND CONTROL?

disregarded when it amounts to “insignificant post-solution activity”161 or mere “data-gathering steps.”162 Even if the Court is generally
disposed to recognize patent eligibility for “advanced diagnostic
medical techniques,” it might not be satisfied with identifying a
claims-drafting maneuver that works for future patent applicants, but
leaves current holders of claims drafted in “determine and infer” format with disappointed expectations.
Concern for the disappointed expectations of patent holders may
have played a decisive role in the divided panel’s analysis of the patentability of composition of matter claims to isolated DNA, an issue
on which the Supreme Court opinion in Bilski v. Kappos offers little
guidance.163 The United States as amicus curiae did not defend the
PTO’s longstanding practice of allowing patents to issue on isolated
DNA molecules, but instead urged the Federal Circuit to affirm the
District Court’s holding that these claims were unpatentable products
of nature.164 Nonetheless, Judge Lourie and Judge Moore both noted
161

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-192.
E.g., In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839-40 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“The sole
physical process step in Grams’ claim 1 is step [a], i.e., performing clinical tests on
individuals to obtain data. … The presence of a physical step in the claim to derive
data for the algorithm will not render the claim statutory.”).
163
The Court in Bilski was not concerned with the patentability of products of
nature and did not include “products of nature” in its list of time-honored exclusions
from patent eligibility. On the other hand, the Court cited with approval its own prior
decisions in cases recognizing such an exclusion. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980) (“Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was
not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether
living or not, and human-made inventions.”); Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo Inoculant, 333
U.S. 127, 131 (1948) (Mixed culture of naturally occurring strains of bacteria selected
for their non-inhibition of each other’s function was not patentable subject matter
because “[i]t is no more than the discovery of some of the handiwork of nature ….
The combination of species produces no new bacteria, no change in the six species of
bacteria, and no enlargement of the range of their utility. …. Their use in combination
does not improve in any way their natural functioning. They serve the ends nature
originally provided, and act quite independently of any effort of the patentee.”); J.
E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 534 U.S. 124, 134 (2001) (citing with approval
the above-quoted passage from Chakrabarty); Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex
Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1931) (Orange rind treated with borax to protect against decay was not sufficiently changed from its natural state to constitute a patentable
“manufacture” because “[a]ddition of borax to the rind of natural fruit does not produce from the raw material an article for use which possesses a new or distinctive
form, quality, or property.”).
164
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party
in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No.
2010-1406), 2010 WL 4853320, available at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/genepatents-USamicusbrief.pdf
(last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
162
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that such a departure from longstanding practice should come from
Congress rather than from the courts.165
The main disagreement among the panel members concerned
whether segments of DNA that have been isolated from chromosomes
but are otherwise unaltered are unpatentable products of nature. For
Judge Lourie, human intervention to cleave the covalent bonds that
unite the DNA molecule to other genetic material in its natural state is
enough to make the isolated DNA molecules “markedly different
[with a] distinctive chemical identity and nature [] from molecules
that exist in nature,” making the claims patent eligible.166 Judge
Moore, however, read the precedents as requiring that the isolated
molecule must do more than “serve the ends nature originally provided,” and that human modifications must give the product “markedly different characteristics with the potential for significant utility”
in order to avoid the exclusion for products of nature.167 Judge Moore
concluded that short DNA molecules isolated from chromosomes
meet this standard because they could be used as primers and probes
for diagnostic testing, but that longer DNA sequences that are unsuitable for these uses present a more difficult question. 168 Nonetheless,
given the longstanding practice of the PTO to allow patents on isolated DNA, Judge Moore concluded that the longer sequences were
also patentable subject matter, noting concern for the impact of a contrary decision on the settled expectations of the biotechnology industry.169 Judge Bryson dissented from the holding of patent eligibility
for isolated DNA, reasoning that, notwithstanding the breaking of
chemical bonds, the isolated genes are not “materially different” from
the same genes as they occur in nature. 170
The variety of claims at issue, the sharp disagreements among the
panel members, and the care taken in each opinion to be faithful to
precedent provide a strong foundation for Supreme Court review.
B. The Minimalist “Coarse Filter” Approach
Other post-Bilski patentable subject matter opinions from the Federal Circuit suggest a different approach, assigning a minimal role to
subject matter exclusions reminiscent of the pre-Laboratory Corpora165
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1354-55 (Lourie, J.); id. at
1367-68, 1370-73 (Moore, J., concurring in part)
166
Id. at 1351 (Lourie, J.).
167
Id. at 1359-60 (Moore, J., concurring in part) (citations omitted).
168
Id. at 1365-67.
169
Id. at 1366-70.
170
Id. at 1373, 1375 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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tion era in the Federal Circuit. The first of these opinions was
authored by Chief Judge Rader in Research Corporation Technologies v. Microsoft,171 shortly before the second Federal Circuit decision
in Prometheus v. Mayo. Judge Rader, who also joined Judge Lourie’s
opinion as a member of the Prometheus panel, set an entirely different
tone in writing for the Research Corporation panel.172 That case involved an invention in the longstanding patent eligibility battleground
of information technology – specifically, a new method for allowing
computers and printers to more efficiently render approximations of
an image using digital halftoning technology.173
Judge Rader began by noting that patentable subject matter is only
a “threshold test,” and that the statute directs primary attention to the
other conditions and requirements for patentability.174 He mentioned
the “machine or transformation” test only to recognize that the Supreme Court had faulted that test as “nonstatutory.”175 Turning to the
question of whether the claimed processes were excluded from patentable subject as “abstract,” Judge Rader did not seek clues to the
meaning of that term, but saw its ambiguity as empowering the Federal Circuit to minimize the exclusion:
The Supreme Court did not presume to provide a rigid formula
or definition for abstractness. … Instead, the Supreme Court
invited this court to develop “other limiting criteria that further
the purposes of the Patent Act and are not inconsistent with its
text.” …With that guidance, this court also will not presume to
define “abstract” beyond the recognition that this disqualifying
characteristic should exhibit itself so manifestly as to override
the broad statutory categories of eligible subject matter and the
statutory context that directs primary attention on the patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act.176
Explaining why “this court perceives nothing abstract in the subject matter of the processes claimed,” Judge Rader noted the “functional and palpable applications” of the process, and observed that
“inventions with specific applications or improvements to technologies in the marketplace are not likely to be so abstract that they over171

627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
Id. at 862 (The panel consisted of Chief Judge Rader and Judges Newman
and Plager.).
173
Id. at 862-63.
174
Id. at 868.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 868.
172
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ride the statutory language and framework of the Patent Act.”177 The
opinion notes in passing that some of the claims require a “high contrast film,” “a film printer,” “a memory,” and “printer and display
devices” and that these features “also confirm this court’s holding that
the invention is not abstract.”178 But Judge Rader does not dwell on
these physical elements or use the words “machine or transformation”
to explain their relevance.179 The discussion of patentable subject
matter concludes by noting that claims that “pass the coarse eligibility
filter” might still fail the tests of claim definiteness and written description and that § 112 of the Patent Act180 might be a more appropriate way to invalidate claims that are not clear and concrete rather than
a subject matter exclusion.181
This minimalist approach to the role of § 101 appears again in the
analysis of biopharmaceutical method claims in the recent decision of
the Federal Circuit in Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC on
remand from the Supreme Court.182 Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Bilski v. Kappos, the Federal Circuit had affirmed summary
judgment of invalidity for the patent claims under the machine-ortransformation test in a brief opinion.183 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari, vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Bilski.184 The three opinions from a divided panel on remand reveal sharp
divisions both on the role of patentable subject matter doctrine and on
its application to the claims at issue. None of the opinions embraces
the machine-or-transformation test.
Judge Newman, joined by Chief Judge Rader, found the claims of
two of the three patents at issue patent-eligible under § 101, although
questioning whether the same claims would survive challenges to
their validity based on other statutory requirements, but affirmed the
judgment of invalidity as to the claims of a third patent.185 Regrettably, the invalidity analysis for the third patent rests on a questionable
reading of the claim language, as Judge Moore explains in an em177
178
179
180

Id. at 868-69.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 868-69.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010) (outlining the extent to which claims must be

specified).
181

Research Corp. Techs., 627 F.3d at 869.
Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, Nos. 2006-1634, 2006-1649,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18126 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2011). See also supra notes 83-84
and accompanying text (prior history).
183
Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, 304 F. App’x. 866 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
184
Classen Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010).
185
Classen Immunotherapies, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18126 at *44.
182
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phatic dissent.186 Judge Rader wrote separately in an opinion joined
by Judge Newman to inveigh against “a rising number of challenges
under 35 U.S.C. § 101” and to implore the court to “decline to accept
invitations to restrict subject matter eligibility.”187
Although expressing profound skepticism toward “judge-made” restrictions on
patent eligibility, Judge Rader attributes the problem to “litigants”188
rather than to the Supreme Court and does not enter into an analysis of
how the Court’s precedents apply to the claims at issue in Classen.
As Judge Newman explains, the patents arise from Dr. Classen’s
discovery that administering the first dose of a vaccine prior to 42
days of age substantially decreases the likelihood of chronic immunemediated disorders.189 The two patents that Judge Newman deems
patent-eligible (the ‘139 patent and the ‘739 patent) claim a method of
immunizing subjects by first “screening” information about the occurrence of chronic disease in patients who have been immunized according to different immunization schedules, “comparing” the results,
“identifying” the lower risk immunization schedule, and then “immunizing” patients according to the schedule that shows a lower risk of
chronic immune-mediated disorders.190 The third patent (the ‘283 patent), according to Judge Newman, omits the final step of immunizing
patients and “claims the idea of comparing known immunization results that are, according to the patent, found in the scientific literature,
but does not require using this information for immunization purposes.”191 In other words, the ‘139 and ‘739 patents claim methods
186

Id. at *51, *53-54, *55 n.1 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“I am perplexed by
the majority’s suggestion that this claim ‘is directed to the single step of reviewing the effects of known immunization schedules,’ Maj. Op. at 20, as the
claim clearly requires immunizing mammals and then comparing the results
to the known group …. The ‘283 patent claim clearly and unequivocally
requires the physical act of immunization and it is unfair of the majority to
analyze the claim for § 101 purposes as though it did not have that step.”).
187

Id. at *45 (additional views of Rader, C.J., joined by Newman, J.).
Id. at *45 (“The language of § 101 is very broad. Nevertheless, litigants
continue to urge this court to impose limitations not present in the statute.”)
189
Id. at *5 (majority opinion).
190
Id. at *5-6.
191
Id. at *25. This interpretation is difficult to reconcile with the language of
the claim, which explicitly calls for immunizing patients in a trial in order to determine the lowest risk immunization schedule: “A method of determining whether an
immunization schedule affects the incidence or severity of a chronic immunemediated disorder in a treatment group of mammals, relative to a control group of
mammals, which comprises immunizing mammals in the treatment group of mammals with one or more doses of one or more immunogens, according to said immunization schedule, and comparing the incidence, prevalence, frequency or severity of
said chronic immune-mediated disorder or the level of a marker of such a disorder, in
188
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that include first comparing the results of studies to figure out the
lower risk schedule and then immunizing patients according to that
schedule, while the ‘283 patent does not require actually immunizing
patients and may be infringed merely by reading study results.
Given these claim interpretations, the results Judge Newman
reaches would be easy to justify under the machine-or-transformation
rule in reliance on Prometheus v. Mayo and Association for Molecular
Pathology, but she instead looks primarily to Judge Rader’s opinion in
Research Corporation for guidance. She invokes Research Corporation repeatedly for the principles that § 101 is a “coarse eligibility
filter,” that other substantive conditions and requirements are available to weed out patents that are too vague or indefinite or conceptual,
and that inventions with applications in the marketplace are unlikely
to be so abstract that they are excluded from the broad reach of the
statute.192
Under this approach, Judge Newman concludes that the ‘139 and
‘739 patents pass the threshold of patentability because they are “directed to a specific, tangible application, as in Research Corporation.”193 That application is “lowering the risk of chronic immunemediated disorder.”194 Although she notes that the claims include “the
physical step of immunization on the determined schedule,” she does
not purport to apply the machine-or-transformation test. Instead she
invokes “the guidance of Bilski v. Kappos that ‘[r]ather than adopting
categorical rules that might have wide-ranging and unforeseen impacts,’ exclusions from patent-eligibility should be applied ‘narrowly,’” and notes that the claims “raise cogent questions of patentability” that are better resolved under the substantive requirements
for patentability.195 Turning to the ‘238 patent, Judge Newman asserts
that it would be infringed merely “by reviewing information on
whether an immunization schedule affects the incidence or severity of
a chronic immune-mediated disorder” without “the subsequent step of
immunization on an optimum schedule.”196 She concludes that the
claims “do not include putting this knowledge to practical use, but are
directed to the abstract principle that variation in immunization
schedules may have consequences for certain diseases” and are therethe treatment group, with that in the control group.” Id. at *8-9. According to Judge
Newman, “The ‘immunizing’ in the ‘283 patent refers to the gathering of published
data, while the immunizing of the ‘139 and ‘739 patent claims is the physical implementation of the mental step claimed in the ‘283 patent.” Id. at *25.
192
Id. at *21-24.
193
Id. at *24.
194
Id.
195
Id. at *24.
196
Id. at *25.
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fore too abstract to get past “the coarse filter of § 101.”197 She mentions the machine-or-transformation test only to explain the Supreme
Court’s disapproval of it as the “sole test” of patent eligibility and to
summarize Classen’s arguments for patent eligibility.198
Two difficulties with this analysis make it problematic as an explanation for the decision. First, as noted previously, the ‘238 patent
claim language, contrary to Judge Newman’s account, appears to require immunizing research subjects:
A method of determining whether an immunization schedule
affects the incidence or severity of a chronic immune-mediated
disorder in a treatment group of mammals, relative to a control
group of mammals, which comprises immunizing mammals in
the treatment group of mammals with one or more doses of one
or more immunogens, according to said immunization schedule, and comparing the incidence, prevalence, frequency or severity of said chronic immune-mediated disorder or the level
of a marker of such a disorder, in the treatment group, with
that in the control group.199
That Judge Newman would attempt the difficult sleight of hand
necessary to read this limitation out of the claim language suggests
that the transformative step of bringing about bodily changes by administering treatment to a mammal in fact does matter to her assessment of patent eligibility, notwithstanding her avoidance of the label
“machine-or-transformation” or other “categorical rules.”
Second, if we take Judge Newman at her word that what matters
is not chemical transformation in the bodies of immunized mammals,
but the practical application of the lower-risk immunization schedule,
then it is not clear why a method of determining whether an immunization schedule affects the incidence or severity of chronic immunemediated disorders fails that test. In biopharmaceutical fields, many
patents cover inventions useful in drug development that do not recite
steps of administering the as yet undiscovered drugs to patients. In
fact, the one claim that was unanimously upheld by the panel in Association for Molecular Pathology—the claim to a method of screening
potential cancer therapeutics—did not recite a step of administering
the effective compounds to patients.200 Presumably, Judge Newman
197

Id. at *25-28.
Id. at *13, *26, *29.
199
Id. at *8-9 (emphasis added) (citing U.S. Patent No. 5,723,283 claim 1
(filed May 31, 2995).
200
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1334.
198
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does not mean to call into question the validity of these patents, yet it
is unclear that they would pass the test of “practical use” that purportedly distinguishes the patent-eligible from patent-ineligible claims in
Classen.
In dissent, Judge Moore argues that, properly interpreted, the
claims of the ‘238 patent are indistinguishable from those of the ‘139
and ‘739 patents for § 101 purposes,201 and that all of them improperly claim fundamental scientific principles:
Having discovered a principle – that changing the timing of
immunization may change the incidence of chronic immune
mediated disorders –Classen now seeks to keep it for himself.
In the ‘283 patent, he accomplishes this goal by claiming the
use of the scientific method to study the incidence of chronic
immune mediated disorders. This preempts the field of study,
and prevents any investigation into any immunogen, known or
unknown, and to any disease, known or unknown, over any period of time. Where, as here, a patent preempts an idea, a basic
building block of science, within a field of study, the patent in
practical effect is a patent on the idea itself. 202
Judge Moore repeatedly quotes Justice Breyer’s dissent in Laboratory Corporation in arguing that allowing claims of the sort at issue
would interfere with the development of further knowledge.203 Like
Judge Newman, Judge Moore does not dwell on the machine-ortransformation test. For Judge Moore the inclusion in the claims of a
claim step of immunizing patients, whether subsequent to a comparison of immunization schedules as in the ‘139 and ‘739 patents or prior
to that comparison as in the ‘238 patent, could not transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process; in the former case the
immunizing step was “nothing more than post-solution activity” and
in the latter case it was “nothing more than a data gathering step.”204
Distinguishing Prometheus v. Mayo, she notes that the Prometheus
court concluded that the claims in that case “were not merely data
gathering steps or insignificant post-solution activity” and that because they were limited to the administration of specific drugs, they
did not “preempt broadly the use of any natural correlation,” and
faults the majority for failing to consider the preemptive sweep of
201

Classen Immunotherapies, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18126 at *51, *53-57,

*54 n.1.

202
203
204

Id. at *60-61 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972))..
Id. at *61, *63.
Id. at *62.
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Classen’s claims.205 She rejects the majority’s view that it was necessary to consider the substantive conditions for patentability in order to
invalidate these claims:
When, as here, the claims so clearly offend the constitutional
imperative to promote the useful arts, where they preempt all
application of a principle or idea, it is entirely appropriate to
hold them unpatentable subject matter before reaching anticipation, obviousness, or any other statutory section that might
also prove invalidity.206
In sum, the patentable subject matter cases decided by the Federal
Circuit since the Supreme Court decision in Bilski v. Kappos reveal
considerable disagreement within that court about the limitations of
patentable subject matter and about the role those limitations should
play in determining what may be patented. Without further clarification from the Supreme Court, some members of the Federal Circuit
seem ready to return to the pre-Bilski machine-or-transformation rule,
while others seem ready to roll the clock back even further and return
to the “useful, concrete, and tangible” rule of State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group.207 Yet if the Justices agreed on anything
about the contours of patentable subject matter in Bilski v. Kappos, it
was that both of these positions get it wrong.
III. IDENTIFYING THE PURPOSE OF SUBJECT MATTER
BOUNDARIES
The Supreme Court has directed the Federal Circuit to consult the
statute and Supreme Court precedent in elaborating rules of patentable
subject matter, but the task of extrapolating from these sources to address unresolved issues is challenging without more clarity as to the
purposes and functions of subject matter boundaries in the patent system. The majority opinion in Bilski v. Kappos avoids reference to any
policy moorings that might either guide the interpretation of prior
decisions or steer courts in future cases. But without understanding
what patentable subject matter boundaries are supposed to accomplish, it is difficult to figure out where those boundaries belong.
Earlier judicial opinions have advanced policy arguments in favor
of exclusions from patentable subject matter that overlap with policies
served by other doctrinal limitations on what may be patented, invit205
206
207

Id. at *53.
Id. at *66.
See supra note 13.
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ing the argument that patentable subject matter is redundant to these
other limitations.208 For example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
justified exclusions of “fundamental principles,” “abstract ideas” and
“mathematical algorithms” by invoking concerns about allowing unduly broad patent rights.209 But patent law addresses this concern
elsewhere by limiting the allowable scope of patent claims to exclude
prior art210 and nonenabled embodiments.211 Indeed, some of the older
precedents date back to a time before the statute explicitly distinguished “patentable subject matter” from other doctrinal limitations
on the allowance of patents, making it difficult to map the basis for
those decisions onto modern doctrinal categories.212
Commentators have stepped into the void, producing a rich and
varied scholarly literature. Some scholars find unarticulated normative
intuitions lurking behind the boundaries laid down in prior decisions
and seek to guide courts, Congress, and the PTO to use subject matter
boundaries to ensure that the patent system continues to advance similar normative goals today.213 Some see the boundaries as failed attempts to lay down rules that have inevitably become outmoded in the
face of technological change, preferring other doctrinal tools for identifying what is and is not patentable that offer more flexible standards
and have proven more stable over time.214 Some attempt to disaggre208

See Risch, supra note 2; Duffy, supra note 33.
E.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68, 72 (1972) (“Here the ‘process’ claim is so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of
the BCD to pure binary conversion …. [T]he patent would wholly preempt the
mathematical formula and, in practical effect, would be a patent of the algorithm
itself.”); see also Collins, supra note 33, at 50-53 (discussing O’Reilly v. Morse, 56
U.S. 62 (1853)).
210
35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2010).
211
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010).
212
E.g., Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127 (1948)
213
E.g., Olson, supra note 64 (arguing that until recently courts deployed
patentable subject matter to exclude categories of invention that did not require patent
incentives, using an implicit but unarticulated economic analysis to determine which
fields would exhibit public goods problems that would lead to underproduction of
inventions in the absence of patents, and that under that analysis business methods
should be excluded); Yu, supra note 33 (arguing that patentable subject matter should
ensure that patents advance Constitutional goal of promoting progress of science and
useful arts by excluding basic tools of scientific and technological work, distinguishing invention from discovery, and defining subject matter boundaries consistent with
industrial policy).
214
See Duffy, supra note 33, at 614 (arguing that over time clear “rules”
restricting patentable subject matter have proven unstable in the face of technological
change relative to more flexible “standards,” and that other patent law “standards,”
such as nonobviousness and enablement, better address concerns about excessive
patenting than rigid exclusionary rules); Richard S. Gruner, Intangible Inventions:
Patentable Subject Matter for an Information Age, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 355, 356 n.5
209
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gate the limitations on patentable subject matter in order to sharpen
and distinguish criticisms that apply to some parts of the doctrine but
not others.215 Some take the boundaries as given and try to identify
interpretive moves that will better advance normative goals within
those constraints.216 And some would largely eliminate patentable
subject matter limitations, relying on other rules of patent law to separate the patentable wheat from the unpatentable chaff.217
A. Threshold Inquiry
The closest that prior decisions have come to distinguishing the
function of patentable subject matter from the functions of other patent law doctrines is the characterization of patentable subject matter as
a “threshold inquiry” or the “first door” an invention must pass
through in order to get a patent. This image, which appears in decisions of the Supreme Court,218 the Federal Circuit,219 and the Court of
(2003) (“Adjustments in patentable subject matter standards frequently follow
changes in technological knowledge. These adjustments are needed to maintain patent
incentives as inducements for design efforts and disclosures in new technological
realms.”).
215
Chiang, supra note 33 (distinguishing two kinds of patentable subject
matter limitations that present different costs and benefits: (1) categorical exclusions,
which trade off administrative cost savings against the costs of over- and underinclusiveness; and (2) scope limitations, which are more costly to administer but less
prone to error); Duffy, supra note 33 at 614 (distinguishing patentable subject matter
“rules” from “standards”). See also Collins, supra note 55 (arguing that the focus on
the machine-or-transformation test has led to miscoding of determine-and-infer
claims as possibly within exclusion for “abstract ideas” rather than as possibly within
exclusion for “mental processes”).
216
E.g., Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “an Unpatentable Abstract
Idea”, supra note 33 (identifying multiple distinct meanings of “abstract idea” that
raise different concerns and merit different treatment).
217
E.g., Risch, supra note 2; Osenga, supra note 31.
218
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (“The § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry is only a
threshold test. Even if an invention qualifies as a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, in order to receive the Patent Act’s protection the claimed
invention must also satisfy ‘the conditions and requirements of this title.’ § 101.
Those requirements include that the invention be novel, see § 102, nonobvious, see §
103, and fully and particularly described, see § 112.”).
219
In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“We do not reach the
ground relied on by the Board below … because we conclude that many of the claims
are ‘barred at the threshold by § 101.’ It is well-established that ‘[t]he first door which
must be opened on the difficult path to patentability is § 101.’ … Only if the requirements of § 101 are satisfied is the inventor ‘allowed to pass through to’ the other
requirements for patentability, such as novelty under § 102 and, of pertinence to this
case, non-obviousness under § 103.”); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950-51 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (en banc) (“Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter under §
101 is a threshold inquiry, and any claim of an application failing the requirements of
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Customs and Patent Appeals,220 suggests a gatekeeper role for patentable subject matter at the point of entry to the patent system, providing a rough first cut that leaves some kinds of inventions outside the
system while admitting others to be examined more closely within the
PTO to determine their patentability. Subject matter exclusions that
may be applied at the front door of the patent system (such as, for
example, a rule that excludes “business methods” from patentable
subject matter) could potentially reduce administrative costs of the
patent system by restricting the number of patent applications that
require more costly individualized examination.
Such a threshold rule is especially attractive if the excluded subject matter either does not require the incentive of patent protection or
would not get past the additional tests of patentability that are administered in the course of examination. On the other hand, to the extent
that the rule excludes subject matter that might otherwise pass these
tests and withholds patents from fields that might benefit from patent
incentives, it may be criticized as “eliminating broad swaths of innovation with a machete” when a more carefully deployed “scalpel”
would do a better job of promoting progress.221 But as Professor TunJen Chiang explains, this tradeoff between administrative costs and
over- and under-inclusiveness is inherent in the choice of a bright-line
rule over more discriminating standards.222
A number of problems limit the value of patentable subject matter
as a threshold test. First, if the threshold test is to provide a useful
screen, the exclusions should rest on at least a rough assessment of
whether patent protection is socially desirable for different categories
of invention, thereby excluding patents in areas where they are either
§ 101 must be rejected even if it meets all of the other legal requirements of patentability.”), but cf. id. at 950 n.1 (“Although our decision in Comiskey may be misread by some as requiring in every case that the examiner conduct a § 101 analysis
before assessing any other issue of patentability, we did not so hold. As with any
other patentability requirement, an examiner may reject a claim solely on the basis of
§ 101. Or, if the examiner deems it appropriate, she may reject the claim on any other
ground(s) without addressing § 101. But given that § 101 is a threshold requirement,
claims that are clearly drawn to unpatentable subject matter should be identified and
rejected on that basis. Thus, an examiner should generally first satisfy herself that the
application’s claims are drawn to patent-eligible subject matter.”).
220
In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated in part sub nom.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) (“The first door which must be
opened on the difficult path to patentability is § 101 …. If the invention, as the inventor defines it in his claims … falls into any one of the named categories, he is allowed
to pass through to the second door, which is § 102; ‘novelty and loss of right to patent’ is the sign on it.”).
221
Risch, supra note 2, at 658; Duffy, supra note 33, at 622-23.
222
Chiang, supra note 33, at 1357-63.
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unnecessary to promote innovation or impose monopoly costs that
exceed corresponding benefits in the form of innovation incentives.223
Yet in the absence of systematic investigations of these effects by
policymakers, judicial exclusions from patentable subject matter rest
at best on seat-of-the-pants intuitions of jurists from earlier eras. According to Professor David Olson, courts in the past “implicitly analyzed” the economic effects of patents by subject matter area in developing rules that “distinguish, albeit not explicitly, efficient from
inefficient subject matter for patentability,”224 but beginning with the
1980 decision of the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty
courts have “largely abandoned any gatekeeping role” in favor of a
broad reading of statutory standards for patentable subject matter.225
But the attribution of implicit economic analysis to courts of the past
is fraught with possibilities for misunderstanding, projection and revisionist history. Moreover, if one trusts that the decisions of judges are
guided by economic intuitions that they fail to articulate, it is not clear
why one would have more confidence in the decisions that restricted
patentable subject matter in the distant past than in the decisions that
expanded patentable subject matter in the recent past. Either way, it
takes a leap of faith to believe that the rules courts devise are smarter
than the reasons they adduce in support of those rules. The less confidence one has that the rules of patentable subject matter correspond
even roughly to the goals of the patent system, the less sense it makes
to assign a gatekeeper function to those rules.
Second, in order to provide a means for economizing on administrative costs, patentable subject matter exclusions must provide clear
rules that can be applied without the need for individualized examination. While some exclusions from patentable subject matter have provided clear rules for a period of time, such as past exclusions for business methods and living things,226 often these exclusions have eventually proven to be overinclusive in the face of technological change.227
223

Olson, supra note 64, at 203 (“[T]he critical first inquiry for the patentability of an invention should be whether the invention is within a subject matter area that
is subject to a public goods problem such that absent patent protection an underproduction of inventions in that subject matter will result. If a public goods problem
exists, then the subject matter should be patentable and the other tests for patentability
should be applied. If no public goods problem exists, either because of the nature of
the subject matter, or because other factors exist that adequately incentive production
of the public good, then subject matter patentability should be denied and the patentability inquiry should end.”).
224
Id. at 205-15.
225
Id. at 214-15.
226
Chiang, supra note 33, at 1382-83; Duffy, supra note 33 at 623-38.
227
Chiang, supra note 33, at 1383-85; Duffy, supra note 33, at 616-17.
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Technological change makes categorical exclusions that may have
made sense in an earlier era seem out of date and unworkable. Thus an
exclusion for living things, taken for granted as long as that category
overlapped substantially with products of nature, became anomalous
with the advent of genetic engineering,228 an exclusion for mathematical algorithms became problematic when the advent of computers
made the execution of algorithms by machine a field of applied technology and incorporated information technology into industrial processes,229 and an exclusion for business methods became problematic
when information technology and the internet blurred the boundaries
between business and technology.230 As Professor John Duffy has
documented, bright-line rules have difficulty keeping up with technological change, which is especially challenging for a legal regime that
functions to promote technological change.231 Those categorical exclusions that are clear enough to be applied by a bouncer at the front
door of the PTO may thus become unstable over time.
Conversely, subject matter exclusions that operate as flexible
standards, such as that for “abstract ideas,” have proven more durable
over time, but their meaning is too vague and uncertain for them to
serve as gatekeepers in a way that economizes on administrative costs.
Critics of patentable subject matter doctrine cite its lack of clarity
relative to other requirements for patent protection,232 suggesting that
administrative efficiency might be better served by proceeding directly to individualized examination. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has
recognized the impracticality of requiring that patentable subject matter determinations precede full examination in every case and clarified
that, contrary to the implication of the phrase “threshold test,” there is
no rule that requires that patentable subject matter be considered first
when it might be more expeditious to dispose of an application on
another ground.233
Patentable subject matter also fails to economize on administrative costs when it operates as a limitation on allowable claim language
and scope rather than as a complete exclusion from the patent system.
As categorical field exclusions have disappeared, remaining limita228

Duffy, supra note 33, at 625-32; Eisenberg, supra note 1.
Olson, supra note 64, at 206-18.
230
Id. at 218-24.
231
Duffy, supra note 33, at 616 (“[C]hanging conditions present well-known
difficulties for rules, and the law of patentable subject matter inevitably operates on
the ever-changing forefront of human knowledge and creativity.”).
232
Risch, supra note 2, at 606-07 (“Attention to rigorous application of the
patentability standards would replace unclear and undefined subject matter rules
based on supportable statutory interpretations of the Patent Act.”).
233
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950 n.1 (Fed Cir. 2008).
229
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tions on patentable subject matter, such as the exclusions for abstract
ideas and natural phenomena, are more likely to require careful claimdrafting than to keep an invention from crossing the threshold of the
PTO. As Professor Chiang explains, the prohibitions on patenting
abstract ideas and scientific principles are not about excluding certain
subject matter from the patent system entirely but rather about avoiding unduly broad claims.234 Inventors can often respond by narrowing
their claims, and it requires the attention of an examiner to determine
which of the claims in a patent application are worded so broadly that
they wholly preempt the use of an abstract idea or a natural correlation
and which are permissibly confined to particular applications. Such
limitations may be useful as a means of avoiding the allowance of
unduly broad claims, but they do not serve as threshold tests that
economize on administrative costs.
In sum, although one could imagine patentable subject matter
serving a useful role as a threshold inquiry, economizing on administrative costs by excluding some kinds of subject matter from the front
door of the patent system without the need for a full examination,
patentable subject matter doctrine does not and cannot serve that role
in its current form.
B. Limiting heterogeneity
A different function for patentable subject matter boundaries may
be to limit the technological diversity of inventions that must be accommodated in a one-size fits all patent system.235 By longstanding
tradition, now locked in by treaty,236 the U.S. patent laws apply essentially the same rules of patent law across all fields of technology.237
234
Chiang, supra note 33, at 1385-92 (explaining Supreme Court decisions in
O’Reilly v. Morse, The Telephone Cases, Funk v. Kalo, and Gottschalk v. Benson as
concerned with unduly broad claims).
235
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law & Economics Agenda for the
Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2081, 2084 (2000).
236
Agreement on Trade–Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art.
27, Apr.15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 (commonly known as the TRIPS Agreement), Art. 27,
§ 1(“[P]atents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in
all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are
capable of industrial application. … [P]atents shall be available and patent rights
enjoyable without discrimination as to … the field of technology ….”).
237
Congress has nonetheless sometimes enacted field-specific patent law
provisions, including a prior user defense against infringement of business method
patents, 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2010), relief from the nonobviousness requirement for
certain biotechnology process claims, 35 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2010), relief from remedies
for infringement of patents by medical practitioners and related health care entities,
35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2010), and term extensions for drug patents, 35 U.S.C. § 155
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Yet economic research has repeatedly demonstrated that the needs of
innovators for patent protection vary significantly across fields.238
Because of variation in the conditions for innovation, patent rules that
provide the correct balance between patent incentives and competition
in one field are likely to get the balance wrong in other fields, providing too much protection in some contexts and too little in others. Professor Michael Carroll calls the resulting inefficiencies “uniformity
costs.”239
Patentable subject matter boundaries can help to minimize uniformity costs by limiting the diversity of innovations that patent law
covers, thus making it easier to achieve a more optimal level of protection for a narrower range of innovations. The challenge of arriving
at rules of patent law that satisfy the diverse denizens of the patent
system today is visible in the divergent positions of different industries concerning patent law reform. Relative newcomers to the patent
system—mostly from the information technology and service sectors—have favored reforms that old-timers such as the pharmaceutical
industry have opposed.240 New categories of patentable subject matter
also pose administrative challenges for the PTO, which initially may
lack the necessary expertise and record of prior art to evaluate patent
applications properly in new fields.241 Perhaps a less diverse community of innovators, maintained through the use of patentable subject
matter boundaries to exclude newcomers, would more readily agree
on what the rules should be.

(2010). The recently passed Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29
(Sept. 16, 2011) extends prior user rights to all fields of technology, id. § 5 (codified
at 35 U.S.C. § 273) and eliminates special rules for evaluating the nonobviousness of
biotechnological processes, id. § 3(c) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103) but has additional
field-specific provisions treating tax strategies as prior art, id. § 14, providing a transitional period of post-grant review of business method patents, id. § 18, and prohibiting the issuance of patents on human organisms, id. § 33,
238
See generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND
HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009) (discussing the economic analysis and rapid
changes that have occurred since 2003 in patent reform).
239
See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for
Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2009); Michael W.
Carroll, One For All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law,
55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 849 (2006) (defining uniformity cost as “the distortions
caused by rights that are more or less robust than necessary to have induced investments in innovation that deliver a net benefit to society.”).
240
Brian Kahin, Patents and Diversity in Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 389 (2007).
241
See Merges, supra note 64, at 589-91 (1999) (describing initial difficulties
for the PTO in examining applications in the areas of business methods, biotechnology, and software).
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This picture of the patent system as a gated community, with subject matter boundaries to exclude newcomers, invites a number of
objections. First, although subject matter boundaries may limit uniformity costs for those fields that remain patent eligible, they do nothing to achieve the correct balance between incentives and competition
for excluded fields. Unless there is reason to believe that patent protection is unnecessary for the excluded fields, the resulting uneven
pattern of protection seems at least as likely to create distortions and
inefficiencies as a uniform set of rules applied to diverse fields. It
seems especially problematic to exclude new fields from patent protection, since the development of new technologies may have far
greater social value than incremental improvements in existing
fields.242 Even a requirement for explicit Congressional action to extend patent protection to new fields of technology would add another
layer of costs and uncertainty to pathbreaking innovations, creating a
risk that new technologies could get delayed or derailed.
From a political economy perspective, having diverse interests
with a stake in the patent system may be advantageous if it provokes
vigorous debate about public policy initiatives. Otherwise, likeminded firms might encounter little opposition when they lobby for
legislative changes that are more likely to advance their private interests than to balance competing interests in innovation and competition. In other words, uniformity costs from a patent system that seeks
to regulate diverse interests may be preferable to unchecked rentseeking in a system that is more narrowly tailored to affect concentrated interests.243
Finally, even if patentable subject matter boundaries might be deployed to minimize uniformity costs, current patentable subject matter
doctrine is not well-suited to that task, for essentially the same reasons
that it is not well-suited to serve as a gatekeeper at the threshold to the
patent system. Uniformity calls for field exclusions of a sort that the
courts have repeatedly rejected, rather than for vague crosscutting
242
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1980) (“[Parker v.] Flook
did not announce a new principle that inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress when the patent laws were enacted are unpatentable per se. To read that concept into Flook would frustrate the purposes of the patent law. This Court frequently
has observed that a statute is not to be confined to the ‘particular application[s] …
contemplated by the legislators.’ [] This is especially true in the field of patent law. A
rule that unanticipated inventions are without protection would conflict with the core
concept of the patent law that anticipation undermines patentability.”)
243
WILLIAM M. LANDES, & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (AEI Press 2004), available at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040608_Landes.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
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standards, such as the exclusion for “abstract ideas,” that do not correspond to field distinctions in any apparent way. And of course, if the
goal is to exclude those fields in which less protection is optimal, it
would make sense to engage in policy analysis, largely absent in the
current system, to identify which fields belong inside and outside patentable subject matter boundaries.
C. Beyond the threshold: public domain, claim scope and
building blocks
Most patentable subject matter decisions that invalidate some
claims spare other claims in the same patent or application, suggesting
that patentable subject matter is functioning as a scalpel that determines how inventions may be claimed rather than as a barricade that
excludes certain categories of invention entirely. Even if patentable
subject matter doctrine lacks the necessary clarity and field specificity
to function as an efficient threshold test, it might still provide a useful
tool for the PTO and the courts to use in denying or invalidating particular patent claims that threaten to impose costs that exceed their
benefits. Some scholars have suggested that patentable subject matter
is redundant to other doctrinal limitations on patentability that would
support the same outcomes, raising the question of whether it is necessary or appropriate to use patentable subject matter limitations to do
this work.244 But these other doctrines may sometimes fail, leaving
patentable subject matter limitations as a backstop. Doctrinal redundancy is a common feature of legal systems and may make sense if
the interest at stake is important.
1. Prior Art
Some cases about the exclusion of natural products and phenomena of nature from patentable subject matter suggest a concern that the
claimed invention is largely the handiwork of nature, and that the
value-added of the inventor is relatively slight. For example, in Funk
Brothers Seed v. Kalo Inoculant,245 the Court held invalid a claim to a
mixed culture of bacterial strains that were selected by the inventor
for their capacity to allow plants to fix nitrogen from the environment
without inhibiting each other’s effectiveness. The Court’s description
contrasts the wonders of nature with the inventor’s trivial advance in
packaging:
244
245

E.g., Risch, supra note 2, at 598.
Funk Brothers Seed v. Kalo Inoculant 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
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Bond does not create a state of inhibition or of noninhibition in the bacteria. Their qualities are the work of nature.
Those qualities are, of course, not patentable. For patents
cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of nature. The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun,
electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse
of knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws of
nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.

….
The aggregation of select strains of the several species
into one product is an application of that newly discovered natural principle. But however ingenious the discovery of that natural principle may have been, the application of it is hardly more than an advance in the packaging
of the inoculants.
….
[O]nce nature’s secret of the noninhibitive quality of certain strains of the species of Rhizobium was discovered,
the state of the art made the production of a mixed inoculant a simple step. Even though it may have been the
product of skill, it certainly was not the product of invention.246
This analysis does not rest entirely on the exclusion of phenomena of nature from patentable subject matter. Indeed it cannot, because the Court concedes that Bond’s “aggregation of
select strains … into one product is an application of that newly
discovered natural principle” rather than a claim to the natural
principle itself.247 It is difficult to imagine what a claim to the
natural principle itself would look like or what it would mean.
As Professor Collins explains,
On its face, this prohibition on claiming unapplied natural
principles and the like might seem simply to mean that Einstein cannot claim E=mc2 itself and Newton cannot claim the
universal law of gravitation itself. However, the doctrine of
patent eligibility would not be needed to keep such direct
246
247

Id. at 130-32 (citations omitted).
Id.
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claims to newly discovered principles, truths, or laws out of
the patent regime. They are patent gibberish. Patent claims describing “the state of affairs in which E=mc2” are malformed
in that they don’t describe a set of things or processes at all.248

The ground for invalidation of Bond’s claim to the mixed
culture seems to be as much about the obviousness of the inventor’s aggregation of strains (“a simple step … not the product of
invention”)249 as it is about the exclusion of the phenomena of
nature from patentability.
Essential to the Court’s conclusion that the mixed culture
was “not the product of invention” is its treatment of the newly
discovered properties of the bacteria as “part of the storehouse
of knowledge of all men.”250 In effect, the Court treats Bond’s
discovery of noninhibitive strains as if that much of his contribution were prior art, and concludes that the further step of
combining those strains in a mixed culture was nothing more
than the exercise of “ordinary skill.” Prior251 and subsequent252
cases have taken a similar approach, treating excluded subject
matter as if it were prior art in evaluating the patentability of the
claimed invention. This approach seems to have one foot in the
doctrine of patentable subject matter and the other in prior art
doctrines such as novelty and nonobviousness.
Judge Giles Rich, one of the principal architects of the 1952
Patent Act, criticized this approach as fundamentally confused
in an opinion for the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in
the case of In re Bergy that borders on insubordination.253 The
Supreme Court had vacated and remanded for reconsideration in
248

Collins, supra note 33 at 56-57.
Funk Bros. Seed, 333 U.S. at 132.
250
Id. at 130.
251
E.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 115 (quoting with approval the following passage from the decision in Neilson and others v. Harford and others in the
English Court of Exchequer: “[T]he plaintiff does not merely claim a principle, but a
machine, embodying a principle, and a very valuable one. We think the case must be
considered as if the principle being well known, the plaintiff had first invented a
mode of applying it by a mechanical apparatus to furnaces ….”).
252
E.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1978) (“Whether the algorithm was in fact known or unknown at the time of the claimed invention, as one of
the ‘basic tools of scientific and technological work,’ it is treated as though it were a
familiar part of the prior art.”) (citation omitted).
253
596 F.2d 952, 959 (CCPA 1979).
249
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light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Parker v. Flook.254
Judge Rich took the opportunity instead to criticize the Supreme
Court’s approach, stating that “we find in Flook an unfortunate and
apparently unconscious, though clear, commingling of distinct statutory provisions which are conceptually unrelated, namely, those pertaining to the categories of inventions in § 101 which may be patentable and to the conditions for patentability demanded by the statute
for inventions within the statutory categories, particularly the nonobviousness condition of § 103….”255 Focusing on the statement in
Flook “that a ‘mathematical algorithm’ or formula is like a law of
nature in that it is one of the ‘basic tools of scientific and technological work’ and as such must be deemed to be ‘a familiar part of the
prior art,’ even when it was not familiar, was not prior, was discovered by the applicant for patent, was novel at the time he discovered
it, and was useful,” Judge Rich warned that “[t]his gives to the term
‘prior art,’ which is a very important term of art in patent law, particularly in the application of § 103, an entirely new dimension with consequences of unforeseeable magnitude.”256
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court appeared to retreat from the
approach of treating natural products and phenomena as prior art. In
Diamond v. Diehr, the Court even cited Judge Rich’s opinion in Bergy
with approval for the proposition that the question of whether a particular invention meets the test of novelty under § 102 is “wholly apart
from whether the invention falls into a category of patentable subject
matter.”257 Yet the Court has never explicitly overruled the approach
of the prior decisions, and in Bilski v. Kappos the Court quoted the
same passage from Parker v. Flook that Judge Rich had criticized in
Bergy without expressing any disapproval.258
254
In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (CCPA 1977), vacated sub nom. Parker v.
Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978).
255
In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
256
Id. at 965-66 (emphasis in original). If the Court’s approach represented a
departure from the scheme of the Patent Act at the time, Congress more recently
appears to be following the Court’s lead by providing for the treatment of “any strategy for reducing, avoiding, or deferring tax liability, whether known or unknown at
the time of the invention or application for patent,” as if it were a part of the prior art
in evaluating inventions for patentability. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-29 §14,(a) (Sept. 16, 2011).
257
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 190 (1980) (citing In re Bergy, 596 F.2d
at 961).
258
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 1330 (“The Court concluded that the process at issue
there was ‘unpatentable under § 101, not because it contain[ed] a mathematical algorithm as one component, but because once that algorithm [wa]s assumed to be within
the prior art, the application, considered as a whole, contain[ed] no patentable invention.’”) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 594).
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Some scholars have responded to the recent revival of patentable subject matter limitations by arguing that subject matter
exclusions are redundant to other limitations on what may be
patented, including those based on prior art. Professor Michael
Risch argues that cases like Parker v. Flook could be resolved
through rigorous application of prior art doctrines without the
need for murky rules concerning patentable subject matter,259
while Professor Kristen Osenga criticizes the PTO and courts
for use of subject matter exclusions as “proxies for other difficult questions of patentability and policy.”260
However, it is not at all clear that existing prior art doctrine
on its own would provide an alternative basis for the holdings
that the Supreme Court arrived at through its patentable subject
matter jurisprudence. The Patent Act itemizes the available
categories of prior art in § 102.261 Each of the categories listed in
the statute identifies a prior source of human knowledge with no
mention of products or phenomena of nature that have not yet
come to the attention of humans. Section 102 thus precludes the
patenting of an invention if it was previously known or used by
others,262 patented or described in a printed publication,263 in
public use or on sale,264 disclosed in a co-pending patent application,265 and so forth. Products and phenomena of nature
would seem to count as prior art only to the extent that they fall
into one of the categories listed in § 102. In other words, without assistance from the doctrine of patentable subject matter,

259

Risch, supra note 2, at 598-609.
Osenga, supra note 31, at 1115-23.
261
In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (“[I]n 1952 Congress
voiced its intent to consider the novelty of an invention under § 102 where it is first
made clear what the statute means by ‘new’, notwithstanding the fact that this requirement is first named in § 101.”). The same list determines the sources of
260

prior art for evaluating the nonobviousness of an invention under 35 U.S.C. §
103 (2010). Hazeltine Research v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252, 255-56 (1965) (§
102(e)); In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980, 984 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (§ 102(b)); In re Bass,
474 F.2d 1276, 1287 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (§ 102(g)); Oddzon Products v. Just
Toys, 122 F.3d 1396, 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (§102(f)).
262
263
264
265

35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2010).
35 U.S.C. § 102 (a) - (b) (2010).
35 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (2010).
35 U.S.C. § 102 (e) (2010).
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newly discovered products and phenomena of nature do not
seem to qualify as prior art under § 102 alone.266
In a challenge to the validity of patents on isolated and purified DNA sequences, Professor Oskar Liivak has argued that
patent claims to products isolated from nature violate a Constitutional requirement of originality, codified at § 102(f) in a provision that precludes the issuance of a patent if the applicant
“did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented.”267 This provision is generally understood to prohibit the
patenting of an invention by one who derived it from someone
else.268 Professor Liivak believes that the same limitation applies
(or should apply) to inventions that are derived from nature.269
Moreover, consistent with the approach of the Supreme Court,
he would count material derived from nature as prior art in
evaluating the obviousness of inventions that have been modified through human intervention.270 But there is little authority
to support this interpretation of current law; indeed, none of the
four judges—three on the Federal Circuit and one on the District
Court for the Southern District of New York—who considered
the patent eligibility of claims to isolated and purified DNA sequences in Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office271 even mentioned derivation or § 102(f), resting

266
But cf. Collins, supra note 33, at 57 (arguing that claims to phenomena of
nature “would be
inherently anticipated under section 102, as the states of affairs described by the
claims long predated their discovery by humankind.”).
267
35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2010); see Oskar Liivak, The Forgotten Originality
Requirement: A Constitutional Hurdle for Gene Patents, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 261 (2005). This provision will be eliminated for claims with an effective
filing date after March 16, 2013 under § 3 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-29 (Sept. 16, 2011).. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Derivation and Prior
Art Problems with the New Patent Act, available at
http://www.patentlyo.com/files/sarnoff.2011.derivation.pdf (visited Nov. 12, 2011).
268
See Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1576
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“To show derivation, the party asserting invalidity must prove both
prior conception of the invention by another and communication of that conception to
the patentee.”).
269
Liivak, supra note 267, at 265.
270
Id. at 291-92 (citing Oddzon Products v. Just Toys, 122 F.3d 1396 (Fed.
Cir. 1997)).
271
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, No. 09 Civ. 4515 (RWS) 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418 (2010), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
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instead on §101 and cases excluding products of nature from patentable subject matter.
In sum, although some patentable subject matter decisions concerning products and phenomena of nature appear to rest in part on
considerations of novelty, originality, and nonobviousness that find
expression elsewhere in the Patent Act, prevailing interpretations of
these other statutory provisions do not make these subject matter limitations redundant. Instead, to the extent that the patentable subject
matter cases remain good law, they seem to go beyond the definitions
of prior art in the statute and case law to exclude newly discovered
natural products and phenomena, and obvious variations of them,
from patent protection.
2. Claim Scope
Many patentable subject matter cases reflect a concern that the invalidated claims are unduly broad. An early example is O’Reilly v.
Morse,272 in which the Supreme Court held invalid the eighth claim of
a patent to Samuel Morse on his invention of the telegraph machine:

I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery
or parts of machinery described in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of my invention being the
use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electromagnetism, however developed,
for making or printing intelligible characters, signs or letters at any distances, being a new application of that
power, of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.273
In invalidating this claim, the Court stressed that its broad
scope would give Morse control over future advances yet to be
made by others.274 The Court worried that Morse could dominate
272

O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854).
Id. at 112.
274
Id. at 113 (“If this claim can be maintained, it matters not by what process
or machinery the result is accomplished. For aught that we now know, some future
inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing
at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic current, without using any part of
the process or combination set forth in the plaintiff’s specification. … But yet if it is
covered by this patent, the inventor could not use it, nor the public have the benefit of
it, without the permission of this patentee.”)
273
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future advances without having to seek additional patent rights, and
therefore without providing further disclosure:
[T]he patentee would be able to avail himself of new discoveries in the properties and powers of electro-magnetism which
scientific men might bring to light. … And if he can secure the
exclusive use by his present patent, he may vary it with every
new discovery and development of the science, and need place
no description of the new manner, process, or machinery upon
the records of the patent office.…In fine, he claims an exclusive right to use a manner and process which he has not described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not
describe when he obtained his patent. The court is of opinion
that the claim is too broad, and not warranted by law.275
The Court’s repeated observation that the eighth claim extends
beyond the specific means disclosed by Morse in his specification276
suggests to some commentators that the best way to understand the
holding is that the eighth claim was not properly enabled by the disclosure.277 Yet the opinion also recites that “the discovery of a prin-

ciple in natural philosophy or physical science is not patentable,”278 and subsequent cases have cited O’Reilly v. Morse as
authority for the exclusion of fundamental principles and abstract
ideas from patentable subject matter.279
A similar concern with claim scope appears in many subsequent
cases invalidating particular claims as drawn to fundamental principles and abstract ideas. For example, the Supreme Court in Gottschalk
v. Benson observed that the claim it held invalid for lack of patentable
subject matter was “so abstract and sweeping as to cover both

known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary conversion” and that “the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical
formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm
itself.”280 This theme reappears in Bilski v. Kappos, in which the Supreme Court notes that “[a]llowing petitioners to patent risk hedging
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Id. at 113.
Id. at 118-21.
277
See Risch, supra note 2, at 600-01; Duffy, supra note 33, at 641-42 (citing
late 19th century sources).
278
O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 116.
279
E.g., The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 534 (1888); Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 67-68 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592 (1978).
280
Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 68.
276
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would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.”281
The Federal Circuit has also used patentable subject matter doctrine to invalidate broad claims. For example, in its 1989 decision in
In re Grams,282 the Federal Circuit upheld a rejection for lack of patentable subject matter of an astonishingly broad claim to “a method of
diagnosing an abnormal condition in an individual” by performing
clinical laboratory tests, comparing the parameter values for the individual with reference values, and determining whether there are any
abnormalities.283 The Federal Circuit held that the claim was improperly drawn to a mathematical algorithm, noting that although the
claim refers to the performance of clinical tests, the patent disclosure
“does not bulge with disclosure about those tests, and indeed the
specification states that ‘the invention is applicable to any complex
system, whether it be electrical, mechanical, chemical or biological, or
combinations thereof.’”284 The court concluded that “applicants are, in
essence, claiming the mathematical algorithm, which they cannot do
under Gottschalk v. Benson. The presence of a physical step in the
claim to derive data for the algorithm will not render the claim statutory.”285
In each of these cases the courts see the breadth of the claim as
indicating that it is not limited to a particular application of the princi281

Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231.
In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
283
The full claim reads: “1. A method of diagnosing an abnormal condition
in an individual, the individual being characterized by a plurality of correlated parameters of a set of such parameters that is representative of the individual’s condition, the parameters comprising data resulting from a plurality of clinical laboratory
tests which measure the levels of chemical and biological constituents of the individual [sic] and each parameter having a reference range of values, the method comprising [a] performing said plurality of clinical laboratory tests on the individual to measure the values of the set of parameters; [b] producing from the set of measured parameter values and the reference ranges of values a first quantity representative of the
condition of the individual; [c] comparing the first quantity to a first predetermined
value to determine whether the individual’s condition is abnormal; [d] upon determining from said comparing that the individual’s condition is abnormal, successively
testing a plurality of different combinations of the constituents of the individual by
eliminating parameters from the set to form subsets corresponding to said combinations, producing for each subset a second quantity, and comparing said second quantity with a second predetermined value to detect a non-significant deviation from a
normal condition; and [e] identifying as a result of said testing a complementary
subset of parameters corresponding to a combination of constituents responsible for
the abnormal condition, said complementary subset comprising the parameters eliminated from the set so as to produce a subset having said non-significant deviation
from a normal condition.” Id. at 836-37 (emphasis and alteration appear in decision).
284
Id. at 840.
285
Id.
282
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ple/idea/algorithm, but reaches beyond that application to claim the
principle/idea/algorithm itself. In other words, claim scope is what
distinguishes an unpatentable principle/idea/algorithm from its patenteligible particular applications.286
If the problem with the claims in these cases is that they are unduly broad, arguably the statutory grounds for invalidity should be
failure of enablement under § 112 of the Patent Act287 rather than lack
of patentable subject matter under of § 101 of the Patent Act. But enablement doctrine hardly offers any clearer or more predictable tools
than patentable subject matter for discerning the allowable scope of
patent claims. Although some judicial decisions say that claim scope
must be commensurate with the scope of embodiments that have been
enabled by the patent disclosure,288 others say that the requirement of
an enabling disclosure is satisfied if the specification provides an enabling disclosure of a single embodiment falling within the scope of a
claim.289 Patent claims must extend beyond the particular disclosed
embodiments in order to have any value, and enablement doctrine
offers inconsistent guidance about how far beyond those embodiments
a claim may reach.290
Particularly problematic for enablement doctrine are claims that
cover future embodiments using technologies that have yet to be invented as of the filing date. Some decisions say that such claims fail
286

Cf. Collins, supra note 33, at 50 (noting that one possible meaning of “an
unpatentable abstract idea” relates to abstraction or generality in the claim language
itself).
287
§ 112 provides: “The specification shall contain a written description of
the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same ….” 35
U.S.C. § 112 (2010).
288
E.g., In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Invitrogen Corp.
v. Clontech Labs, Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1070-71 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Martek Biosciences
Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
289
E.g., Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc. 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed.
Cir. 1987); Engel Industries, Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
290
For thoughtful analyses of the doctrine, see Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent
Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 535-38 (2010) (discussing contradictions that
arise from current enablement doctrine); Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of
Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 WISCONSIN L. REV. 1353, 1368-72 (2010) (examining conflicting case law on contemporary enablement doctrine and doctrinal confusion arising form choosing the level of abstraction to define patent protection); Kevin
Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083 (2009)
(characterizing contemporary enablement doctrine as “chaotic” and proposing different rules); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of
Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141 (2008) (arguing that written description
requirement compensates for indeterminacy of enablement standard).
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the test of enablement, reasoning that as of the filing date it would
have required undue experimentation to make the future embodiments,291 but other decisions have upheld similar claims, reasoning
that the original specification disclosed at least one mode of making
and using the invention, even though it did not disclose the later technology.292 Some decisions insist that the disclosure must enable the
“full scope” of the patent claims without undue experimentation,293
yet others hold that “a broad claim may be enabled by disclosure of a
single embodiment.”294 Determining the validity of prior claims that
dominate later-developed technologies presents a difficult choice
about how best to allocate incentives between earlier and later inventors. With competing lines of authority available to justify different
outcomes, enablement fails to provide useful guidance to courts or
examiners in making that fundamental policy choice.
In recent years the Federal Circuit has provided an additional constraint on claim scope in the form of a fortified requirement for a
“written description” of the invention that is distinct from the requirement of enablement.295 This somewhat controversial development has been particularly important in limiting the scope of claims in
biopharmaceutical patents,296 and has arguably eclipsed enablement
doctrine as a limitation on claim scope.297
291
E.g., Plant Genetic Systems v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding that patent claims to a plant cell transformed with a DNA
fragment were not fully enabled where the specification taught how to transform dicot
plants but not monocot plants, and existing technology as of filing date did not provide such a method for monocots).
292
See., e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, 314 F.3d 1313, 133437 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding that patent claim to vertebrate cells with DNA control
sequences for producing erythropoietin was adequately enabled by disclosure of
examples using transformed Chinese hamster ovary and monkey cells yet also covered later technology using endogenous activation of erythropoietin in human cells).
293
Genentech Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(“[T]o be enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art
how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without ‘undue experimentation.’”) (quoting In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
294
Spectra-Physics v. Coherent, 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
295
See Ariad Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly, 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Regents of the Univ. of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
296
See Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 617
(1998); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New
Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 834-35 (1999); Margaret Sampson, The
Evolution of the Enablement and Written Description Requirements Under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 in the Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1262 (2000).
297
See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir.
2004). In this case, the district court held claims to be invalid for lack of both enable-
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Patentable subject matter provides another backstop to the indeterminate doctrine of enablement for limiting the scope of claims arising out of discoveries of fundamental principles or natural phenomena. Such claims raise special concerns for the patent system for two
reasons. First, fundamental principles and natural phenomena are
likely to be especially important to the work of future innovators, and
promoting future innovation is a primary goal of patent law. Second,
newly discovered fundamental principles and natural phenomena may
face few constraints from prior art, which is ordinarily an important
determinant of allowable claim scope.298
Understood as a limitation on claim scope rather than as an exclusion of entire fields from patent protection, this exclusion provides a
principle for limiting the scope of claims that might otherwise be quite
broad and impose social costs that are quite high. Like the doctrine of
enablement, this exclusion balances the interests of prior innovators
against those of subsequent innovators. But while enablement directs
attention towards determining the range of embodiments that the patent disclosure puts within easy reach of those skilled in the art, the
patentable subject matter exclusion directs attention towards determining which aspects of the discovery must remain in the public domain to encourage future innovation. Both determinations present
difficult line-drawing problems and would benefit from clearer policy
guidance.
3. Basic tools of scientific and technological work
A recurring mantra in many judicial opinions about patentable
subject matter is that excluded subject matter constitutes “basic tools”
of scientific or technological work.299 The Supreme Court even recited
this mantra in Bilski v. Kappos, declaring that business methods are
“the basic tools of commercial work” and, “in many cases, the basic
tools of further business innovation.”300 But taken this far, the “basic
tools” concept would seem to cover every step in the course of incremental innovation in any field, and thus fails to explain distinctions
between patentable and excluded subject matter.
ment and written description. The Federal Circuit affirmed on written description
alone, without reaching enablement.
298
See Chiang, supra note 290, at 535.
299
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67;
Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collab. Servs., 628 F.3d at 1353-54; In re Bilski, 545 F.3d
at 952; In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 979; Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418 at *104.
300
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3255.
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Perhaps the relationship between homocysteine levels and vitamin
deficiency in Laboratory Corporation of American Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories makes a better poster child for the “basic tools”
argument than the risk-hedging method in Bilski v. Kappos. Justice
Breyer explains in his Laboratory Corporation dissent that the exclusion of “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” from
patentable subject matter preserves free access to “fundamental building blocks” that are likely to be of value in many future research
paths, thus preventing patents from obstructing future research.301
While conceding that “the category of non-patentable ‘phenomena of
nature,’ like the categories of ‘mental processes,’ and ‘abstract intellectual concepts,’ is not easy to define,” Justice Breyer concluded
“[t]here can be little doubt that the correlation between homocysteine
and vitamin deficiency set forth in claim 13 is a ‘natural phenomenon.’”302
The line-drawing problems may be more difficult than Justice
Breyer recognizes. Professor Allen Yu argues that the traditional exclusions from patentable subject matter for natural phenomena and
products may no longer correspond as closely to the “basic tools of
scientific and technological work” as they did in the past, given that
“[m]uch of biomedical know-how today is based on discoveries about
basic workings of the human body.303 He explains that “[a]lmost all
medical interventions involve restoring or mimicking nature, not replacing or improving nature.”304 In this environment, robust subject
matter exclusions based on a distinction between what is “natural” and
what is “man-made” seem to rest on “ungrounded legalistic and semantics-based arguments” rather than on sound policy considerations.305 Professor Yu proposes as one of several alternatives that the
Court replace its relatively weak prohibition against the patenting of
nature and abstract ideas with “a stronger, more explicit prohibition
against the patenting of ‘basic tools of scientific and technological
work,’” assessed from the perspective of a “person having ordinary
skill in the art” or “PHOSITA.”306 Professor Yu predicts that a
PHOSITA would not consider a test for homocysteine to detect vitamin deficiency to be a basic tool of scientific and technological work,
but would consider genes to be unpatentable under this standard.307
301
302
303
304
305
306
307

Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 548 U.S. at 126-28.
Id. at 135.
Yu, supra note 33, at 395.
Id. at 400-01.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 428-29.
Id. at 429-30.
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While recognizing that this standard is no easier to apply than the distinction between what is natural and what is man-made, Professor Yu
nonetheless argues that his standard is superior because it “focuses on
articulating the costs of patents.”308 Less salient in this approach are
the benefits of patents, such as the social value of the incentives they
provide for commercial product development, which ought to be
weighed against these costs to achieve an efficient balance. Many
inventions are simultaneously both basic tools of scientific and technological work and commercial technologies that may be put to immediate practical use in the diagnosis and treatment of disease. Withholding patents to keep basic tools in the public domain may thus simultaneously withhold incentives for new medical interventions, posing a stark conflict between avoiding the costs and securing the benefits of patents.
If the goal of withholding patents on basic tools of scientific and
technological work is to provide a clear field for future researchers to
make unfettered use of these tools, perhaps an exclusion from patentable subject matter is not the best doctrinal approach. An alternative
that might be less destructive of incentives to develop new medical
interventions would be to give researchers an infringement exemption,
while leaving patent holders with patents that they could assert against
providers of new medical interventions. Regrettably, U.S. law has
done almost exactly the opposite: the Federal Circuit has restricted the
scope of the common law research exemption from infringement liability,309 while Congress has provided a statutory exemption from
patent infringement remedies for medical practitioners and related
health care entities.310
A policy of promoting unfettered access to the basic tools of scientific and technological work does not provide a fully coherent account of patentable subject matter doctrine, and it is not clear that
exclusions from patentable subject matter are the best way to advance
308

Id. at 430.
See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (unauthorized use of a patented invention in noncommercial academic research furthers the
university’s “legitimate business objectives, including educating and enlightening
students and faculty participating in these projects” and therefore “does not qualify
for the very narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense”). A separate statutory defense originally designed for generic drug manufacturers exempts the use of an
invention “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs or veterinary biological products.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2010). This shelters
some uses of patented inventions in biopharmaceutical research that is directed towards new drug development. See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545
U.S. 193 (2005).
310
35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2010).
309
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that policy. But it is as coherent a story as the courts have offered on
the topic of patentable subject matter. The repeated references to “basic tools of scientific and technological work” in judicial opinions
about patentable subject matter suggest a policy interest that might
explain past decisions and guide future decisions about the scope of
those exclusions. But there is little evidence in the opinions that the
courts take this interest seriously. Instead the words appear inside
quotation marks in paragraphs full of string citations, as part of a formal homage to prior decisions rather than as an analytical tool for
resolving current controversies at the frontiers of patentable subject
matter.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has created a state of high uncertainty as to
the rules of patentable subject matter. By directing the lower courts to
seek guidance from its own prior decisions without actually explaining the policies served by patentable subject matter doctrine, it demands formal adherence to the principle of stare decisis without following the discipline of common law reasoning. Many cases speak of
patentable subject matter as a threshold test at the front door of the
patent system, but current doctrine lacks the necessary clarity to function as an initial screen prior to full examination. Although field exclusions from patentable subject matter might in the past have limited
the heterogeneity of inventions covered by patent law, field exclusions
have largely been repudiated by the courts, leaving vaguely worded
exclusions that are as challenging to interpret and apply as any other
standards for patentability. Some cases, particularly those asserting
the unpatentability of natural phenomena and fundamental principles,
have called for treating discoveries about the natural world as if they
were already in the public domain, an approach that is sometimes
criticized for conflating subject matter limitations with doctrines concerning prior art and disclosure. But patentable subject matter limitations are not redundant to these other doctrines. Patentable subject
matter offers an additional tool for limiting the scope of patents that
might otherwise unduly impede future research. Language in patentable subject matter opinions about “basic tools of scientific and technological research” hints at a policy justification for this approach that
is not fully examined, although it is consistently quoted approvingly.
Perhaps these cases have wisdom to offer that could guide courts today in adapting patentable subject matter doctrine to inventions at the
current forefronts of technology. But in the absence of a more careful
judicial account of the role of patentable subject matter to guide modern courts in channeling the wisdom of their predecessors, continued
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adherence to these prior decisions seems instead like a form of deadhand control. By reasserting its precedents as binding authority without explaining them, the Supreme Court compounded this problem in
Bilski v. Kappos. In future decisions, it might do better to begin by
distinguishing the function of patentable subject matter limitations
from the functions served by other requirements for patent protection.
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